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41Roughly 20 years ago, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) entry into force established a broad multilateral 
framework governing trade in goods and services and 
establishing certain rules regarding international invest-
ment. In the decades that have followed, negotiations 
on additional bilateral and multilateral agreements have 
deepened and expanded international rules on trade and 
investment. With significant negotiating activity continu-
ing on these texts, now is a key time for assessment of 
their implications. 
The need for an assessment of the scope and extent of 
this growing body of international rules is particularly 
important in light of the agreed consensus on (1) the need 
for governments to take robust action to achieve sustain-
able development,1 and (2) the need for international rules 
to leave domestic governments adequate policy space to 
implement appropriate steps in that regard.2 
This paper aims to aid that exercise, focusing both on the 
role that local content measures can play in advancing 
sustainable development, and the impact that trade and 
investment treaties concluded over the past 20 years have 
had and will continue to have on the ability of govern-
ments to employ those tools. Local content measures 
include a wide range of actions – from import substitution 
policies to requirements on firms to establish manufac-
turing facilities in the host country as a condition for 
receiving market access rights or other incentives. Some 
of those measures such as import substitution policies 
were restricted under the WTO due to wide agreement by 
negotiating parties that the costs of those measures out-
weighed their benefits. But the WTO left many other local 
content measures in governments’ policy toolboxes. As 
is discussed in this paper, however, that is changing, with 
the menu of permissible actions for many countries being 
significantly smaller than it was even a decade ago. 
1  Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on September 25, 2015,  
A/RES/70/1.
2 Id. para. 21.
The following sections elaborate on these trends and their 
implications. Section Two of this paper begins by discuss-
ing the connections between local content policies and 
sustainable development objectives. In particular, it exam-
ines how local content policies relate to three Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in September 2015:
§§ Goal 8 – promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and 
decent work for all 
§§ Goal 9 – build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation 
§§ Goal 10 – Reduce inequality within and among 
countries
These three SDGs were selected because of the importance 
of domestic and international economic law and policy in 
achieving their targets. 
Section Two also briefly explores the role of global value 
chains (GVCs) as both a phenomenon ordering and a way 
of understanding the modern global economy. It high-
lights the relevance of GVCs for policy interventions to 
achieve development objectives. 
Section Three of this paper then examines the constraints 
that international law imposes on local content policies 
relevant to the SDGs. It discusses core aspects of law of the 
WTO and the extensive and still evolving body of inter-
national investment agreements (IIAs) that often impose 
“WTO+” obligations on governments, illustrating the 
overall ratcheting up of restrictions imposed by interna-
tional economic law, and the corresponding ratcheting 
down of policy space. 
Finally, Section Four presents conclusions and options 
aimed at enabling countries – developing countries in 
particular – to pursue local content policies and strategies 
that contribute to the SDGs.
Introduction
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52Worldwide, governments and other stakeholders are devoting renewed energy to achieving sustainable devel-
opment. Defined by the Brundtland Commission nearly 
30 years ago as “development which meets the needs of 
current generations without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs,” sustainable 
development is increasingly being used as a foundational 
objective to orient and guide both public and private 
action.
Three landmark processes in 2015 marked and helped 
solidify the current international consensus regarding 
 sustainable development as an orienting principle. The 
first is the formulation of an “Action Agenda” on Financ-
ing for Development (FfD). In that Agenda, agreed in 
July 2015 at the Third International Conference on FfD, 
world leaders set forth a holistic framework and outlined 
priorities and concrete actions to mobilize the necessary 
resources for achieving crucial objectives.3
In September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted 
the set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals and associ-
ated targets to be met by 2030. As detailed in the United 
Nations’ outcome document, “Transforming Our World: 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” achieving 
the SDGs requires commitment by and strategic collabo-
ration between the public and private sectors to address  
a wide range of pressing environmental, social, and eco-
nomic challenges.
The third process is the negotiation and conclusion of 
an agreement on climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion, which was accomplished in December 2015,4 and 
will be implemented in part through countries’ “Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions.”5
3  Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on  
Financing for Sustainable Development, July 13–16, 2015, para. 2.
4  Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the President, FCCC/
CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, December 12, 2012 (including the Paris Agreement as an 
annex to the Decision).
5  Individually Nationally Determined Contributions or “INDCs” represent 
countries’ respective plans for reducing emissions and may also address other 
issues such as their adaptation plans and support needed from, or provided to, 
other countries. For a collection of INDCs, see http://cait.wri.org/indc/.
Together, these texts emphasize the need for action that 
will promote development that is economically, socially 
and environmentally sustainable. They also recognize the 
importance of government action as a force to leverage 
and shape private sector activity. Tackling the challenges 
that the Action Agenda, the SDGs, and the climate change 
negotiations are responding to requires a government 
hand in the market. Given governments’ limited resources, 
the need for private sector capital and skills, and the 
risk that government measures may hinder rather than 
foster sustainable private sector action, it is fundamen-
tal for governments to be particularly coherent in their 
policy choices and strategic in how they use and leverage 
resources to catalyze and channel private sector resources 
in complementary directions. 
BOX 1  
Common Terms Used in this Paper
Local Content Policy: Definitions of a “local content policy” vary 
widely depending on the context and user. This paper defines it 
broadly as a policy governing foreign investors or investments  
that aims to more actively embed foreign investment in, and 
catalyze spillovers into and linkages with, the domestic economy. 
This definition includes, but is not limited to, measures expressly 
requiring or incentivizing use of local goods, services, and labor. 
It can also include measures such as those requiring foreign 
investors to incorporate firms in the host economy, or to make 
intra-firm expenditures in the host economy. IIAs (defined below), 
often use the term “domestic content”, but generally do not 
define the term. 
International investment agreement (IIA): A treaty between 
countries that governs international investment. An IIA may  
be a bilateral treaty, or a multilateral agreement. It may focus 
solely on investment (as is the case in many bilateral investment 
treaties [BITs]), or may include a chapter on investment within  
a broader free trade agreement (FTA). A key feature of IIAs is that 
most allow investors to take their host states to arbitration to 
enforce the treaty’s investment protection provisions and recover 
damages for breach. This method of dispute resolution is 
commonly referred to as “investor-state dispute settlement” 
(ISDS). 
The New Sustainable Development Agenda 
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Performance requirements: As used in this paper, performance 
requirements are measures in law, regulation or contract that 
require investors to meet specified goals (e.g., on local content) 
when entering, operating in, expanding in, or leaving a host 
country.6 These measures can be a flat requirement, or can be 
required as a condition for the investor to receive a benefit from 
the government such as a tax incentive. 
Technology transfer: There is no single accepted definition of 
“technology” or “technology transfer”; rather, the terms often 
differ based on the particular purpose and context in which they 
are used (e.g., in domestic law or contract, or in multilateral 
environmental agreements). One broad definition of “technology” 
is “the complete body of knowledge applicable to human 
endeavour (as well as the physical embodiments of this).”7 A 
definition of “technology transfer”, adopted for the purpose of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but 
which may also be instructive for other contexts, is:
  a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, 
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to 
climate change amongst different stakeholders such as 
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, 
[NGOs] and research/education institutions. … The broad and 
inclusive term “transfer” encompasses diffusion of technolo-
gies and technology cooperation across and within countries. 
It covers the transfer of [environmentally sound technology] 
processes between developed countries, developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition, amongst devel-
oped countries, amongst developing countries and amongst 
countries with economies in transition. It comprises the 
process of learning to understand, utilize and replicate the 
technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to 
local conditions and integrate it with indigenous 
technologies.8
6  UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements:  
New Evidence from Selected Countries (2003), available at  
http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20037_en.pdf. 
7  Klaus Bosselmann, “Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Sustainability 
Through Improved Regimes of Technology Transfer,” 2/1 Law, Environment & 
Development Journal 19, 22 (2006).
8  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report: Methodological 
and Technical Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary for Policy Makers 1 
(2000).
This paper does not adopt a definition of “technology” or 
“technology transfer”. This is because of both the lack of any clear 
consensus definition to adopt, as well as the fact that IIAs 
likewise do not define or otherwise provide clarity regarding the 
meaning of those terms. This silence in IIAs gives rise to signifi-
cant uncertainty about the breadth of IIA prohibitions on 
requirements to “transfer technology”. 
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73One key area where there may be a particularly strong need for policy space, and where there are increasingly 
IIA-based constraints on that space, is in the context of 
local content policies applied to foreign investors and 
their investments. “Local content” policies, as used in this 
paper, are defined broadly as any policy governing foreign 
investors or investments that aims to more actively  
embed foreign investment in, and catalyze spillovers into 
and linkages with, the domestic economy (see Box 1). They 
include: 
§§ Basic local content requirements: measures that 
require or encourage investors/investments to use 
a certain amount or proportion of local resources 
(including labor, services, materials and parts) when 
producing goods or providing services; 
§§ Export restraints: measures such as quantitative 
restrictions, export taxes, licenses, or other restraints 
used to require or encourage domestic value-addition;9 
§§ Joint venture requirements: measures requiring for-
eign investors to partner with domestic firms or other 
entities such as research institutions;
§§ Local management requirements: measures requiring 
nationals to be on boards or in senior management;
§§ Local equity requirements: measures that require 
firms to have a certain share of domestic ownership;
§§ Location requirements: measures requiring compa-
nies to locate their global or regional headquarters in 
the host state, or to establish operations in a particular 
location in the host state; and
§§ Technology transfer requirements (see Box 1). 
These local content policies can be incorporated in laws or 
regulations as flat requirements on firms, or as a condition 
for firms to receive tax incentives or other government 
benefits; local content policies can also be incorporated 
and implemented in contracts negotiated between firms 
and government entities. 
Local content policies have been and continue to be used 
by countries of all income levels, in different sectors,  
and with varying levels of success in achieving their policy 
9  This domestic value-added may be desirable for generally increasing domestic 
economic activity, as well as generating additional revenues that can help 
compensate for the negative environmental or other externalities of producing 
the raw materials used in the processing.
aims of maximizing the benefits that foreign direct invest-
ment can, but does not necessarily, bring (see Box 2). These 
policy aims include establishing and deepening linkages 
between foreign investment and the domestic economy 
that will promote domestic development;10 building local 
skills, capacity and employment; encouraging specific 
types of activities such as research and development (R&D) 
in the host country; securing domestic support for policies 
such as encouraging deployment of renewable energy; 
and promoting technology exchange between foreign and 
domestic companies.11 
Many debate the advantages and disadvantages of local 
content measures. Proponents of local content measures 
assert, for instance, that countries – particularly devel-
oping countries – should be able to implement them to 
protect and strengthen infant industries not yet able to 
compete in the world market. According to proponents, 
without such measures, undeveloped domestic infant 
industries could not compete with foreign firms in the 
short-run, even though, in the long-run, they may have 
a comparative advantage.12 Proponents also argue that 
local content requirements help to promote development 
goals by increasing local production and employment and 
encouraging transfers of technology between local and 
foreign entities. 
In contrast, opponents argue, among other things, that 
local content policies produce economic inefficiency and 
discourage foreign investors from investing in a country. 
According to such critics, these measures force companies 
to use local inputs and restrict access to global markets. 
They argue that by limiting the available supply of inputs 
that foreign investors can use to produce goods, local con-
tent requirements “raise foreign companies’ production 
costs and ultimately discourage foreign investors from 
investing in the host countries,” while also increasing the 
costs to local consumers.13 Furthermore, critics contend, 
local content measures can be difficult and costly to 
10  WTO/UNCTAD, Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance 
Requirements, Part II, Evidence on the Use, the Policy Objectives, and the 
Impact of Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance 
Requirements, Joint Study by the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats, Document 
G/C/W/307/Add.1 (2001), 235.
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enforce properly. As a result, opponents argue, these tools 
only increase administrative costs for governments, while 
failing to achieve their goals of increased local employ-
ment and production.14
Overall, the debate, which involves many more arguments 
and issues than noted briefly above, is complex, and each 
side of the argument raises important points that should 
be considered in shaping policy. Whether local content 
requirements are good policy tools depends on the nature 
of the requirement, the fit between the requirement 
and its intended purpose, the circumstances in the host 
 country, the needs and characteristics of the relevant 
firms, and the drivers behind those firms’ decisions to 
invest abroad. The issue is much too nuanced and context 
specific for there to be a simple rule on whether, when and 
how a government should employ many of these tools. 
Over the past several decades, local content policies have 
been the subject of extensive analysis and debate, helping 
policy makers and other stakeholders better understand 
whether, in what circumstances, and how, to use these 
tools to harness foreign investment for domestic develop-
ment objectives. 
BOX 2  
Local Content Requirements in the Renewable  
Energy Industry
One area in which a number of countries – developed and 
developing – have introduced local content requirements is in the 
context of their renewable energy industries. Four main argu-
ments have been offered for using local content measures for 
renewable energy investments:
 à “First, the political economy argument is made that [local 
content requirements (LCRs)] augment public support for 
renewable energy projects. Second, proponents point to the 
classic case for protecting infant industries, especially in 
developing countries, until they can compete on the inter-
national market. Third, and, quite importantly, the creation of 
“green” jobs, especially in developed countries, is put forward 
as a justification for the use of LCRs. Fourth, proponents point 
14  UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements:  
New Evidence from Selected Countries (2003) 35.
to the potential environmental benefits of greater competition 
between renewable energy firms over the medium-term”.15
Yet strong arguments have also been raised in opposition:
  Opponents to local content requirements in renewable energy 
policies point to the economic costs – inefficient allocation  
of resources, higher retail power prices, negligible employment 
gains and a negative impact on trade – and question the 
environmental gains in the medium-term.16 
To seize the benefits and avoid undue costs of local content 
requirements, careful design is necessary. Some researchers have 
sought to identify criteria for local content requirements in 
renewable energy production to be successful in terms of global 
objectives of promoting global growth and innovation in the 
renewable energy industry, and spurring domestic economic 
growth and job creation.17 These include: 
1.  Stability and size of market: LCRs need a stable market with 
sufficient size and potential, without which there will be little 
incentive to invest in building up the necessary manufacturing 
capacity. 
2.  Restrictiveness of LCRs: To increase their chances of success, 
local content requirements should not be set too high, too 
quickly. 
3.  Cooperation between government and firms: Dialogue and 
information sharing can help governments set targets based 
on realistic assessments of supply and demand; financial 
assistance from governments to help firms meet targets can 
also help improve positive outcomes, though care needs to be 
taken to ensure costs of any subsidies are tailored to (and do 
not outweigh) their benefits, and that subsidies are appropri-
ately limited in duration. 
4.  Technology and knowledge transfers: LCRs can produce 
benefits when technologies from or needed by the project  
spill over into the domestic economy and increase competi-
tiveness of domestic suppliers. For technology and knowledge 
transfers to occur, there must be adequate absorptive capacity 
in the host country, and a bridgeable gap between foreign  
and domestic technologies.18
 
15  Sherry Stephenson, “Addressing Local Content Requirements in a Sustainable 
Energy Trade Agreement,” (ICTSD 2013) 4.
16  Sherry Stephenson, “Addressing Local Content Requirements in a Sustainable 
Energy Trade Agreement,” (ICTSD 2013) 5.
17  Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, “Local Content Requirements  
and the Renewable Energy Industry – A Good Match?” (ICTSD 2013) 11–13.
18  Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, “Local Content Requirements  
and the Renewable Energy Industry – A Good Match?” (ICTSD 2013) 11–13.
Study_Space_for_Local_Content_Policies_20160822_PRINT.indd   8 22.08.16   18:22
S pa c e  f o r  L o c a L  c o n t e n t  p o L i c i e S  a n d  S t r at e g i e S 9
Experiences of countries like Norway, for example, are 
often cited to show how local content requirements can 
produce long-term domestic benefits (see Box 3). Yet in 
addition to the growing number of legal barriers to the 
use of local content measures (discussed in section 3), 
there are, as noted above, practical challenges to efficient 
and effective employment of those policy tools. One 
commonly cited ingredient for success is the existence of 
necessary capacity and appropriate conditions in the host 
country. For local content requirements to be effective, 
for example, there must be (or must be a plan to develop) 
existing and competitive suppliers of the labor, goods, and 
services necessary to meet specified local content targets. 
Otherwise companies may be unlikely to invest in the  
host economy, may become less competitive due to lower  
quality or higher priced inputs, and/or may fail to meet 
the desired or required levels of local content.
Similarly, professionals and potential domestic joint 
venture partners need to have appropriate skills in order 
to maximize cooperative relationships and minimize the 
risk of being effectively sidelined in management roles 
in and corporate agreements with foreign partners. And 
requirements to invest in a particular location or to estab-
lish headquarters in a particular country or region will 
discourage investment if those locations lack the requi-
site fundamentals such as availability of transportation, 
information and communication technologies (ICT), and 
energy infrastructure needed for operations. 
While taking into account the importance of building up 
domestic capacity and conditions for local content poli-
cies to work, and recognizing that certain local content 
policies may still fail to achieve their objectives or may 
achieve them at a high cost relative to their benefits, 
this paper takes the position that, properly designed and 
implemented, and complemented by an appropriate 
domestic enabling environment and absorptive capacity, 
local content policies can form an important part of gov-
ernments’ strategies to achieve their sustainable develop-
ment objectives. 
BOX 3  
Local Content Policies in the Extractive Industries:  
Norway’s Experience
Traditionally, extractive industries have operated as enclaves, 
producing limited beneficial spillovers into their host economies 
in terms of economic growth and diversification. Yet, as data on 
spending by extractive industry companies indicate, the potential 
advantages of cracking that enclave model are significant. 
According to British Petroleum (BP) and Anglo American, for 
example, they spent an estimated 87% and 64%, respectively, of 
total value created on suppliers in 2014. These expenditures dwarf 
tax and royalty payments which, for BP and Anglo American, 
amounted to 2% and 11%, respectively.19 These figures help 
explain why governments are increasingly seeking to require or 
encourage extractive industry firms to purchase goods and 
services from domestic providers.
One country that has been relatively successful in such efforts to 
fight the enclave model is Norway. 
When oil was first discovered offshore in 1969, Norway did not 
have the expertise to supply offshore oil rigs. But within roughly 
thirty years, companies were sourcing more than 50% of capital 
inputs and more than 80% of operations and maintenance 
inputs from Norwegian firms. The acquired expertise has also 
enabled Norwegian firms to expand into export markets, with 
exports comprising nearly half of their sales by the early 2000s.20
Norway achieved these results through a mix of various meas-
ures. In 1972, for example, Norway passed the Royal Decree, 
requiring all operations to source from Norwegian companies 
unless the Norwegian suppliers were not competitive in terms 
of quality, service and price. The 1985 Petroleum Act further 
stipulated local content provisions to be used when allocating 
licenses in the North Sea. As a result of these measures, Norway 
provided preferential treatment to Norwegian companies in 
all bidding rounds between 1974 and 1994. The licenses also 
included provisions requiring the transfer of skills and technolo-
gies to Norway’s infant domestic petroleum industry. 
19  These figures were calculated based on the companies’ respective annual 
reports.
20  Håvard Halland et al, “The Extractive Industries Sector: Essentials  
for Economists, Public Finance Professionals, and Policy Makers,”  
(World Bank Group 2015) 95.
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A 2015 World Bank Group publication describes other efforts 
designed at promoting R&D, technology transfer, and linkages 
with domestic firms in Norway:
  [I]nternational petroleum companies were, in the early phase 
of oil extraction, encouraged to enter cooperative agreements 
with research units at national universities. This resulted in the 
upgrading of oil-sector-specific skills among academic staff 
and degree programs tailored to the oil sector and related 
industries. … Financial support for [R&D] was taken into 
account in the award of contracts, as was the transfer of skills 
and technology. A corporate income tax rate for the oil sector 
of 78 percent, with all R&D expenses immediately deductible, 
provided a strong incentive for investment in domestic R&D. 
  Similar policies were established at the firm level, encouraging 
multinational oil companies to integrate domestic firms and 
enterprises in large development projects and fostering joint 
ventures and cooperation agreements between domestic and 
foreign companies. International oil companies were required 
to set up fully operating subsidiaries in Norway.21
In 1994, Norway joined the European Economic Area, a single 
market with the European Union, and as a condition of member-
ship was not allowed to continue with its preferential treatment 
policies. However, by that point, the backward linkages were 
already established. 
It is estimated that in 2014 the oilfield services industry was one 
of the largest contributors to the Norwegian economy with 1,100 
companies employing 122,000 people. The industry is composed 
of (1) the seismic segment, which includes the manufacturing  
of equipment for the exploration of oil and gas, and gathering and 
interpreting seismic results; (2) the exploration and production 
drilling segment, which includes companies that own and operate 
drilling rigs and associated services; (3) the engineering, fabrica-
tion and installation segment, which focuses on the construction 
and installation of offshore oil platforms; (4) the operations 
segment, which supports oil companies during the production 
phase; and (5) the decommissioning segment, which advises 
companies on abandonment.22
 
21  Håvard Halland et al, “The Extractive Industries Sector: Essentials  
for Economists, Public Finance Professionals, and Policy Makers,”  
(World Bank Group 2015) 95. 
22 “The Norwegian Oilfield Services Analysis 2014,” (Ernst & Young 2015).
3.1 
Achieving the SDGs: The Role of 
Local Content Policies 
In light of the important role that the SDGs will play in 
shaping domestic and international policy, and the need 
to ensure that international legal frameworks promote, 
rather than hinder, efforts to achieve those goals and asso-
ciated targets, this section seeks to identify the types of 
measures that may need to be adopted to achieve SDGs 8, 
9 and 10, and the policy space that therefore may need to 
be maintained. It focuses on these particular goals due to 
the especially important role that domestic and interna-
tional economic policy will need to play in meeting them. 
3.1.1   Goal 8 – Promote Sustained, Inclusive and 
Sustainable Economic Growth, Full and Produc-
tive Employment and Decent Work for All
Goal 8 focuses on improving the quality and availability of 
productive employment and decent work for all, includ-
ing women, minorities and others that may face particular 
challenges gaining access to necessary education, train-
ing, and job opportunities. Foreign investment can play 
a crucial role in achieving this goal by bringing capital, 
employment, skills, technology, possible linkages with the 
local economy, and channels to help local firms integrate 
and expand in global value chains.
Supportive policies are necessary to facilitate these 
impacts. Policies must aim, among other things, at 
improving opportunities and reducing discrimination 
in education, training and employment, and addressing 
imperfect information and other market failures that  
can result in discriminatory outcomes and disadvantages 
for host country producers and suppliers.
These policies consist of various measures to improve the 
capacity of all for productive employment, with a particu-
lar focus on those suffering from historic or systematic 
discrimination, along with special measures designed to 
require or encourage firms to employ and source from 
marginalized, vulnerable, and historically disadvantaged 
groups. There is therefore both an element that consists 
of capacity building to improve the absorptive capacities 
for (targeted) local content measures, and an element that 
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Examples of SDG Targets   Examples of Relevant Local Content and Supportive  
Capacity Building Policies
8.2    Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through 
diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, 
including through a focus on high-value added and  
labour-intensive sectors 
•	 	Increase	diversification	and	domestic	value-addition	through	
requiring or incentivizing use of local suppliers of goods, 
services, labor
•	 	Provide	support	to	domestic	individuals	and	firms	to	increase	
their competitiveness as suppliers for foreign investments
•	 	Require/incentivize	joint	ventures	or	other	collaborative	
agreements to facilitate linkages and technology transfer
•	 	Require	or	incentivize	R&D	and	education	and	training	in	the	
host country in order to help build domestic capacity
8.3    Promote development-oriented policies that support 
productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, 
creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization 
and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, including through access to financial services 
•	 	Provide	technical	and	financial	support	for	micro-,	small-	 
and medium-sized enterprises to aid their development and 
growth
8.5    By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and  
decent work for all women and men, including for young 
people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for  




vulnerable, and historically disadvantaged groups to gain access 
to business and employment opportunities
•	 	Require	or	incentivize	employment	of	qualified	domestic	labor
TABLE 1  Illustrative Local Content and Supportive Policies for SDG 8
consists of local content policies to help promote eco-
nomic diversification as well as diversity of suppliers and 
employees. Table 1 above lists some of these policies.
3.1.2   Goal 9 – Build Resilient Infrastructure, 
Promote Inclusive and Sustainable 
 Industrialization and Foster Innovation
Among the benefits that foreign investment can bring  
are technology transfer and investments in infrastructure.  
Through, for example, working with local suppliers or 
building the capacity of local citizens who subsequently 
bring their know-how to another firm, foreign investors 
can introduce new technologies in the host country that 
can, in turn, improve the competitiveness of labor and 
firms in that country. 
But, as noted above, technology transfer requires adequate 
absorptive capacity in the host country, and government 
support for education and training is fundamental for 
developing that capacity. Similarly, while technology 
transfer may happen organically, local content policies 
requiring or encouraging use of local providers of goods, 
services, and labor can help ensure and speed that transfer. 
In terms of infrastructure development, investors can 
bring the capital, experience and technology necessary 
to build and/or operate crucial infrastructure to facilitate 
the delivery of public services. Foreign investment may 
also contribute to development of infrastructure even 
when not specifically built for a public purpose. When 
firms in the extractive industries, for example, construct 
transport, power, ICT, or other infrastructure necessary 
for their operations, those investments can be designed 
to also provide other users access and rights to use that 
infrastructure. 
A government role – whether established through regula-
tion, a government equity stake, managerial role, and/or 
other mechanism – in infrastructure projects is essential 
for ensuring that those projects result in affordable and 
equitable access to the infrastructure and associated 
services consistent with SDG 9. Additionally, traditional 
models of “enclave” development in the extractive indus-
tries illustrate that, in the absence of government inter-
vention, extractive industry firms that develop their own 
Study_Space_for_Local_Content_Policies_20160822_PRINT.indd   11 22.08.16   18:22
S pa c e  f o r  L o c a L  c o n t e n t  p o L i c i e S  a n d  S t r at e g i e S12
23 24
23  Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), “A Framework to Approach Shared-Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure” (March 2014); Perrine Toledano and Clara Roorda, 
“Leveraging Mining Demand for Internet and Telecommunications Infrastructure for Broad Economic Development: Models, Opportunities and Challenges” (CCSI June 2014).
24  “Technology forcing refers to regulatory efforts that direct the development of technologies along specific paths. These standards force firms either (1) to innovate 
technologies, forcing the creation of new technologies, or (2) to disseminate technologies, requiring firms to incorporate existing technologies into their products. This use 
of technology-forcing regulation has varied by industry… Despite the difficulties in implementation, technology-forcing regulation has led to numerous innovations, 
including improved environmental quality, safer automobiles, cleaner automobile emissions, and improved disclosure of corporate financial information. Jay P. Kesan and 
Rajiv C. Shah, “Shaping Code,” 18 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 319, 333–337 (2005).
infrastructure will often not provide for broader access to 
or use of that infrastructure even if doing so only margin-
ally increases costs or operational challenges and is the 
only viable way of expanding access to remote regions.
In summary, government policies are crucial to ensure 
Examples of SDG Targets Examples of Relevant Local Content and Supportive  
Capacity Building Policies
9.1    Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient 
infrastructure, including regional and transborder 
infrastructure, to support economic development and 
human well-being, with a focus on affordable and 
equitable access for all  
•	 	Require	or	encourage	firms	to	invest	in	developing	
infrastructure connected with their projects (e.g., providing 
shared use of infrastructure developed in conjunction with 
extractive industry projects)23
•	 	Use	state	equity	or	government	managerial	control	to	guide	
operations of public infrastructure services and ensure they 
meet public policy objectives 
9.2    Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and,  
by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of employment 
and gross domestic product, in line with national 
circumstances, and double its share in least developed 
countries 
•	 	Increase	domestic	diversification	and	value-added	–	particularly	
in least developed countries – through requiring or incentivizing 
use of local suppliers of goods, services, labor
•	 	Provide	support	to	domestic	individuals	and	firms	to	increase	
their competitiveness as suppliers for foreign investments
•	 	Require/incentivize	joint	ventures	or	other	collaborative	
agreements to facilitate linkages and technology transfer
•	 	Require	or	incentivize	R&D	and	education	and	training	in	the	
host country in order to help build domestic capacity
9.3    Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other 
enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to 
financial services, including affordable credit, and their 
integration into value chains and markets
•	 	Provide	technical	and	financial	support	to	small-scale	and	other	
enterprises to develop their capacity and assist them in 
integrating in global value chains
9.4    By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to 
make them sustainable, with increased resource-use 
efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmen-
tally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all 




environmental and efficiency objectives24
9.5    Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological 
capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in 
particular developing countries, including, by 2030, 
encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the 
number of research and development workers per 
1 million people and public and private research and 
development spending 
•	 	Require	or	encourage	firms	to	locate	R&D	activities	in	the	host	
country to develop spillovers and encourage technology 




programs among businesses, government, and/or universities, 
and establish policy frameworks that aim to promote transfer 
and use of developed technologies
•	 Promote	development	of	industry	clusters
TABLE 2  Illustrative Local Content and Supportive Policies for SDG 9
that foreign investment results in the technology transfer 
and infrastructure development that can advance progress 
on Goal 9. Table 2 below lists some of these policies that 
can be enlisted to advance progress on SDG 9.
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3.1.3   Goal 10 – Reduce Inequality Within  
and Among Countries
While recent decades have seen a decline in absolute 
poverty, largely due to significant changes in China, 
developing countries today are, according to some analy-
ses, “somewhat more unequal than three decades ago.”25 
Similarly, within wealthy countries, “[i]nequality increased 
(almost) everywhere over the 1970–2010 period.”26
The causes of this increasing inequality are complex, mul-
tifaceted, and heavily debated; additionally, new data and 
understanding of global value chains (GVCs) has prompted 
increased analysis of how the degree and depth of integra-
tion in GVCs affect these rising patterns of inequality.27 
While many questions remain unanswered about the root 
causes of inequality, SDG 10 calls for policy responses to 
address them. 
25  Facundo Alvaredo & Leonardo Gasparini, “Recent Trends in Inequality and 
Poverty in Developing Countries,” in Handbook of Income Distribution,  
vol. 2A, 699 (Elsevier BV 2015). 
26  Savatore Morelli, Timothy Speeding & Jeffrey Thompson, “Post-1970 Trends  
in Within-Country Inequality and Poverty: Rich and Middle-Income Countries,” 
in Handbook of Income Distribution, vol. 2A, 688 (Elsevier BV 2015).
27  Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Pascal Achard, “Trade,  
global value chains and wage-income inequality,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, 
No. 182 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015).
At the domestic level, some of these policy responses 
echo ones that can be used for achieving other SDGs, 
including using public revenues to invest in education 
and training,28 and adopting efforts to ensure  equality 
of opportunities for all irrespective of their “age, sex, 
 disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or 
other status.”29
Importantly, Goal 10 also addresses the importance of 
ensuring that developing countries have a voice in shap-
ing international economic rules, and calls for those 
rules to reflect the “principle of special and differential 
treatment for developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries.”30 These principles can help ensure 
that developing countries retain policy space to attempt 
to reduce inequality vis-à-vis other countries and within 
their own borders.
28  Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Pascal Achard, “Trade,  
global value chains and wage-income inequality,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, 
No. 182, 7 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015).
29 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Target 10.2.
30 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Targets 10.6 and 10.a.
Examples of SDG Targets Examples of Relevant Local Content and Supportive 
Capacity Building Policies
10.2    By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and 
political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, 
race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other 
status 
•	 	At	the	international	level,	protect	the	ability	of	developing	and	
least developed countries to maximize benefits of foreign 
investment for all within their borders by using policy tools to 
build up domestic capacity, develop linkages with international 
firms, increase investment in disadvantaged regions, integrate 
and benefit from global value chains, and increase economic 
opportunities for marginalized, disadvantaged and vulnerable 
individuals and communities
•	 	At	the	domestic	level,	use	supportive	measures	such	as	
education and skill building to increase the capacity of and 
opportunities available to all to participate in social, economic, 
and political life, and use local content policies to better  
enable individuals and firms to seize those opportunities 
TABLE 3  Illustrative Local Content Policies and Supportive Measures for SDG 10 
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3.2 
Implications of Global Value 
Chains
Crucially, policies adopted to achieve sustainable develop-
ment objectives must take into account modern realities 
of and changes in international trade and production. 
Facilitated by advances in transportation and communica-
tion technologies and liberalization of trade and invest-
ment policies, production has become increasingly frag-
mented in global value chains (GVCs), defined as “the full 
range of activities that firms and workers perform to bring 
a product from its conception to its end use and beyond.”31 
The concept of GVCs captures three characteristics of the 
modern world economy: (1) “the increasing fragmenta-
tion of production across countries;” (2) “the specialization 
of countries in tasks and business functions rather than 
specific products;” and (3) “the role of networks, global 
buyers and global suppliers.”32 These characteristics of 
trade and production in GVCs present new opportunities 
and challenges for countries and the firms within them. 
While myriad questions have arisen regarding appropri-
ate policy strategies to cope with and capitalize on these 
trends, efforts to collect data on the nature and impacts of 
GVCs are increasingly helping to provide answers.33
Some studies indicate that a country’s growth in terms of 
its participation in GVCs is correlated with higher rates 
of economic growth in general.34 Such data has prompted 
policy makers to focus on taking steps to ensure their 
firms become integrated in those chains.35 Additionally, 
studies have emphasized the importance of countries 
expanding and upgrading their roles in GVCs over time, 
31  Efforts to collect more detailed data on GVCs have produced the  
World Input-Output Database, and the Trade in Value-Added database.
32  Sébastien Miroudot and Koen De Backer, “Mapping Global Value Chains,” 
(OECD 2012), TAD/TC/WP/RD(2012)9, 4–5.
33  Gary Gereffi and Karina Fernandez-Stark, “Global Value Chain Analysis: A 
Primer,” (Center on Globalization, Governance and Competitiveness 2011) 4.
34  UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development,” 151. The type of participation also seems to 
matter. One study found that backward participation (i.e., the extent to which 
domestic firms use foreign inputs in exports) Is not correlated with income 
level while “countries with higher per capita GDP tend to have higher forward 
participation ratios” capturing the extent to which a country’s exports are  
used as inputs in products exported by other countries.
35  See, e.g., id. See also Dominique Bruhn, “Global Value Chains and Deep 
Preferential Trade Agreements: Promoting Trade at the Cost of Domestic Policy 
Autonomy?”, German Development Institute Discussion Paper 23/2014.
and increasing the country’s share of value added embed-
ded in exports, as strategies for achieving development 
objectives.36 Yet success in terms of expanding and upgrad-
ing participation in GVCs (within a particular industry or 
across industries) and increasing domestic value added 
is not automatic; appropriate policies are important for 
realizing those outcomes, as well as for ensuring that 
participation in GVCs produces social and environmental 
benefits (or, at a minimum, does not result in undue social 
and environmental harms).37
Notably, some policies to expand and upgrade participa-
tion in GVCs align with those identified as being relevant 
for SDGs 8, 9, and 10. These include supportive measures 
to build capacity and competitiveness of domestic labor 
and firms through education and training as well as 
through improving fundamentals of success such as the 
availability and reliability of infrastructure and necessary 
financing; investing (and collaborating with the private 
sector) in R&D and technology transfer; and creating and 
nurturing linkages between foreign and domestic firms 
through permitting (and even actively encouraging) 
foreign direct investment and employing local content 
policies to promote or require use of domestic goods,  
services, and/or labor.38 For policy makers, data on GVCs 
and a solid understanding of the relevant jurisdiction’s 
legal and economic picture are key for identifying where 
and how to design those measures.
36  UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development,” 170. As UNCTAD notes, increasing the country’s 
share of domestic value added “should not be equated with upgrading. 
Upgrading may be one (important) factor behind increasing domestic value 
added. But even countries with decreasing shares of domestic value added in 
exports may well be on an upgrading path, if they increasingly participate  
in GVCs that create higher overall value, or engage in GVC tasks and activities 
at higher levels of technological sophistication that generate more value in 
absolute terms but at the same time depend on increasing foreign content in 
exports.” Id. at 172. See also Przemylslaw Kowalski et al., “Participation of 
Developing Countries in Global Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Trade-
Related Policies,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 179 (2015) 32–33 
(distinguishing between upgrading and increasing the share of domestic value 
added).
37  UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development,” 177–191.
38  Id. See also Isabelle Ramdoo, “Resource-based Industrialization in Africa: 
Optimising Linkages and Value Chains in the Extractive Sector,” European 
Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper No. 179 (2015); 
Przemylslaw Kowalski et al., “Participation of Developing Countries in Global 
Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Trade-Related Policies,” OECD Trade 
Policy Papers, No. 179 (2015) 82–86. 
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4International Trade and Investment Treaties and Impacts on Policy Space for Achieving Sustainable DevelopmentAs highlighted above, policies aimed at achieving certain SDGs call for a combination of (1) efforts to support 
development of domestic capacity and (2) efforts to 
effectively leverage foreign investment to increase the 
quantity and quality of employment, promote economic 
diversification, develop critical infrastructure, and 
increase technology transfer and innovation. 
Given the government interventions that are required, 
it is important to examine existing and possible future 
limits to policy space that may hinder relevant govern-
ment actions. The scope of commitments under modern 
trade and investment treaties (discussed further below in 
this section) raises questions about whether and to what 
extent those treaties are consistent with the policies and 
policy space needed in this new era of sustainable devel-
opment. While the FfD, the SDGs, and the climate change 
texts envision an active role for the government in influ-
encing and regulating economic activity, international 
trade and investment agreements seem to increasingly 
narrow permissible forms of state intervention. Given 
these two arguably divergent directions governments 
are currently heading in, it is therefore crucial to query 
whether trade and investment treaties leave domestic gov-
ernments adequate policy space to achieve agreed upon 
development objectives and what policy options may exist 
to preserve and make good use of this policy space. 
The Action Agenda on FfD and the 2030 Agenda on Sus-
tainable Development each recognize these issues. The 
Action Agenda on FfD, for example, states:
The goal of protecting and encouraging investment should 
not affect our ability to pursue public policy objectives. We 
will endeavour to craft trade and investment agreements 
with appropriate safeguards so as not to constrain domes-
tic policies and regulation in the public interest.39 
39 Para. 91.
The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development similarly 
addresses the need to comply with restraints imposed 
by international law, and the related need to ensure that 
international law rules do not unduly impose on domestic 
policy space:
We will respect each country’s policy space and leader-
ship to implement policies for poverty eradication and 
sustainable development, while remaining consistent with 
relevant international rules and commitments. At the same 
time, national development efforts need to be supported 
by an enabling international economic environment, 
including coherent and mutually supporting world trade, 
monetary and financial systems, and strengthened and 
enhanced global economic governance. … We commit to 
pursuing policy coherence and an enabling environment 
for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors, 
and to reinvigorating the Global Partnership for Sustain-
able Development.40
The importance of ensuring policy coherence between 
domestic and international law frameworks, and safe-
guarding crucial areas of domestic policy space, is there-
fore widely agreed. The challenge is in implementing 
those aims at both the domestic and international levels.
This section thus seeks to identify the extent of that chal-
lenge. It begins by highlighting the key features of relevant 
WTO rules that restrict the use of certain supportive poli-
cies and local content measures. Those multilateral rules, 
established roughly 20 years ago, now form a baseline 
(with certain exceptions and flexibilities granted to low 
income countries) agreed to by over 160 countries. 
Against that backdrop, this section then turns to exam-
ine IIAs and, in particular, the “WTO+” prohibitions that 
IIAs increasingly place on a wider range of policy tools 
designed to support domestic industry and efforts to har-
ness foreign investment for domestic benefits. 
40 Para. 63.
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4.1 
Overview of key World Trade 
Organization Rules 
With the entry into force of the WTO in 1995,  Member 
States committed to abide by a set of agreements 
that, among other things, place certain restrictions on 
investment-related measures. Relevant agreements are 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs Agreement),41 the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and the 
 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). These 
agreements – the policy restraints they impose, the excep-
tions they include, and the mechanisms for enforcing 
their provisions – are discussed briefly below.
4.1.1   TRIMs Agreement
Scope
The TRIMs Agreement restricts countries’ use of certain 
types of performance requirements that apply to trade in 
goods. It covers two main types of measures: (1) measures 
that require firms (whether domestic- or foreign-owned) 
to use local goods, thereby discriminating against like 
products from other WTO Member States; and (2) meas-
ures that impose quantitative restrictions on imports or 
exports of goods. 
The TRIMs Agreement therefore limits the ability of WTO 
Members to promote domestic economic activities by 
requiring firms to use local goods or barring firms from 
exporting unprocessed raw materials; WTO Members are 
left to encourage those activities by other policy tools such 
as supporting the competitiveness of their local goods 
producers. However, the TRIMs Agreement leaves a variety 
of local content measures untouched such as measures 
requiring use of local service providers, technology 
transfers, joint ventures or domestic equity participation, 
and location of certain activities in the host country or a 
particular region of the host country. 
41  The TRIMs Agreement did not establish new disciplines on performance 
requirements but codified certain prohibitions on performance requirements 
that had previously been interpreted to be inconsistent with the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’s articles on national treatment 
(Article III) and quantitative restrictions (Article XI).
Exceptions
The TRIMs Agreement incorporates exceptions in the 
GATT, including the GATT’s general exceptions, an excep-
tion for government procurement, and certain flexibilities 
for developing countries. 
Enforcement
Violations of the TRIMs Agreement are enforced through 
state-to-state dispute resolution under the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement system. Because of reluctance to incur 
 political or resource costs of bringing claims, measures 
arguably inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement may go 
unchallenged. 
4.1.2   SCM Agreement
Scope
The SCM Agreement prevents WTO Member States from 
granting certain subsidies to firms within their borders. 
Two types of subsidies are flatly prohibited: (1) subsidies 
that are contingent on export performance; and (2) sub-
sidies that are contingent on use of local goods. Other 
subsidies are not prohibited but are “actionable” if they 
cause “adverse effects” to the interests of another WTO 
Member. Establishing “adverse effects” involves a complex, 
fact-specific inquiry that may make successful challenges 
difficult.42
Under these provisions, grants, loans, equity infusions, 
fiscal incentives, and other measures provided by the 
government and designed to support development and 
growth of local industries may be restricted under the 
WTO, and are obviously WTO-inconsistent if they are 
contingent on export performance or have provisions 
requiring use of local goods. 
Exceptions
The SCM Agreement, unlike the TRIMs Agreement, does 
not incorporate exceptions from the GATT. Nevertheless, 
it does include certain flexibilities for developing coun-
42  Under one recent case against the United States, subsidies for R&D that were 
particularly effective in promoting rapid development of new and improved 
product lines were deemed to violate the SCM Agreement because they had 
“adverse effects” on competing products produced by another WTO Member. 
Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
para. 7.1764, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011). The panel’s findings were later 
upheld on appeal. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 960–1012, WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012).
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tries. For example, least-developed countries and other 
countries with a Gross National Product of less than $1000 
per capita are not bound by the SCM Agreement’s restric-
tions on export subsidies. Additionally, special rules apply 
regarding the measures that can be taken against develop-
ing countries if they are found to have violated the SCM 
Agreement. 
Enforcement
Alleged violations of the SCM Agreement can be chal-
lenged through the WTO’s dispute settlement system. In 
certain circumstances, WTO Members can also impose 
“countervailing measures” on subsidized imports of 
another Member State.
4.1.3   GATS
Scope
As explained above, the TRIMs Agreement only covers 
investment measures that affect trade in goods. Measures 
that affect trade in services – including trade that occurs 
through foreign investment – are covered under a separate 
WTO agreement, the GATS. 
The GATS covers foreign investment in services as one 
of four modes of supply of services. This is “Mode 3” on 
“commercial presence” (e.g., foreign direct investment) by 
the service provider of one WTO Member in the territory 
of another WTO Member receiving the service.43 Core 
 provisions of the GATS that restrict states’ abilities to 
impose local content policies on investments in services 
are its articles on market access and national treatment. 
First, the GATS’ article on market access (Article XVI)  
prevents Members from applying measures that:
a) limit the number of service suppliers, 
b) limit the total value of service transactions or assets, 
c)  limit the total number of service operations or 
 quantity of service output, 
d)  limit the total number of natural persons permitted  
to be employed, 
e)  restrict or require certain types of legal entities or  
joint ventures, or 
f) limit the participation of foreign capital. 
43 GATS, art. I.
Subparagraphs (a)–(d) prohibit measures that could be 
used to protect domestic service suppliers (individuals and 
firms) by limiting foreign investors’ ability to access the 
host country’s market; subparagraphs (e) and (f) further 
restrict countries’ abilities to impose certain local content 
measures on foreign investors seeking to gain market 
access. Subparagraph (e), which prohibits restrictions on or 
requirements for investments to be made through certain 
types of legal entities or joint ventures, can prevent a WTO 
Member from requiring foreign firms to partner with local 
companies, or to make an investment through an estab-
lished subsidiary in the host country; and subparagraph 
(f), which prevents restrictions on participation of foreign 
capital, can prevent WTO Members from requiring firms 
to have a certain percentage of domestic equity. 
Second, the GATS national treatment article (Article XVII) 
requires WTO Members to treat foreign investors no less 
favorably than domestic investors. This GATS obliga-
tion aims to limit the use of protectionist measures that 
can reduce economic efficiency and harm consumers. 
It restricts governments’ abilities to impose on foreign-
owned service firms measures that are not similarly 
imposed on domestic-owned entities, and to provide 
domestic-owned entities fiscal, financial, or other incen-
tives that are not similarly provided to foreign-owned 
firms. These provisions can therefore prevent govern-
ments from using various supportive measures to increase 
the competitiveness of domestic service firms and their 
ability to integrate and upgrade in domestic and global 
value chains. 
The “Positive List” Approach
One important feature of the GATS is that it adopts a 
“ positive list” approach to its core obligations. In other 
words, a WTO Member’s market access and national 
treatment obligations under the GATS only apply if and 
to the extent that the WTO Member has affirmatively 
“scheduled” the relevant services sector in its Schedule 
of Commitments. As a result, each WTO Member retains 
freedom to impose local content requirements that would 
contravene the market access and national treatment 
rules of the GATS in service sectors that it has not specifi-
cally identified in its schedule. 
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Exceptions
As noted above, even in sectors that are identified in a 
WTO Member’s schedule, certain reservations and excep-
tions may still allow that country to impose performance 
requirements otherwise inconsistent with the GATS 
obligations. In particular, the GATS contains a number 
of exceptions provisions similar to the GATT, which 
can protect the use of local content measures in certain 
circumstances. These include exceptions permitting states 
to avoid or address balance-of-payments difficulties;44 
exceptions carving out government procurement from 
the agreement’s obligations;45 exceptions for measures 
necessary to achieve specified policy objectives such as 
protection of public morals, maintenance of public order, 
and protection of human, animal or plant life or health;46  
and measures that states consider necessary to protect 
their essential security interests.47 
Enforcement 
The GATS, like the TRIMs Agreement, GATT, and SCM 
Agreement, is enforced through state-to-state proceedings 
under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. 
4.1.4   Conclusions Regarding WTO Rules and 
Restrictions on Policy Space for Local Content
Several WTO agreements – the TRIMs Agreement, SCM 
Agreement and GATS – restrict the use of certain perfor-
mance requirements. These restrictions focus to a great 
extent on preventing measures that discriminate against 
goods providers located in other WTO Member States  
in favor of goods providers established within the domes-
tic jurisdiction. The GATS also places certain limits on 
measures affecting foreign investors, including measures  
favoring local service suppliers over foreign service  
suppliers, and measures requiring foreign firms to enter 
into joint ventures with domestic entities as a condition 
of market access; yet those GATS provisions only apply 
to sectors if and to the extent WTO Member States have 
expressly agreed. Thus, notwithstanding the limits WTO 





states some degree of flexibility to adopt local content 
measures, including those:
§§ providing SCM-Agreement-consistent subsidies or 
other supports to domestic firms (to the extent there  
is no relevant GATS commitment);
§§ requiring or incentivizing use of domestic service  
suppliers (to the extent there is no relevant GATS  
commitment) and domestic labor; 
§§ requiring joint ventures or a certain share of domes-
tic equity (to the extent there is no relevant GATS 
commitment);
§§ requiring or incentivizing transfers of technology  
(to the extent there is no relevant GATS commitment);
§§ restricting exports (through measure other than  
quantitative restrictions) in order to encourage devel-
opment of downstream segments of the value chain;
§§ requiring or incentivizing R&D or other expenditures 
to be made in the host state; and
§§ requiring or incentivizing firms to locate their head-
quarters or particular activities in the host state, or to 
locate their investment in a particular area in the host 
state. 
As is discussed in section 3.2 below, however, much of this 
policy space preserved under WTO law is being reduced 
through IIAs. Additionally, although not discussed in this 
paper, negotiations on the Trade-in-Services Agreement 
(TISA) among 23 economies, which is reported to be using 
a negative list approach for the national treatment obliga-
tion, may further erode states’ flexibilities to use local 
content measures. 
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4.2 
Investment Treaties 
Alongside the emerging consensus on the role that the 
public sector must play in guiding and shaping private 
economic activity for sustainable development, there is 
another emerging trend: a proliferation of bilateral and 
multilateral IIAs that constrain the policy flexibility of 
governments (see Box 1). In brief, IIAs are international 
agreements between two or more countries that set forth 
rules regarding host countries’ treatment of covered 
foreign investors and investments. As a general principle, 
those rules govern conduct by all branches (e.g., execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial) and levels (e.g., local, state/
provincial, federal/central) of government. In certain 
circumstances, IIAs also govern conduct of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).48
The number of IIAs has skyrocketed in recent years. In 
the early 1990s, there were only 400 of these agreements. 
Roughly ten years later, that number had increased to 
over 2,000.49 Presently, there are over 3,000 IIAs, though 
not all have entered into force. Roughly 2800 of those IIAs 
are stand-alone bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The 
remaining IIAs are either multilateral investment treaties, 
or investment chapters embedded within more compre-
hensive free trade agreements (FTAs) that, in addition to 
investment, govern other issues such as trade in goods, 
trade in services, and protection of intellectual property.
The strongest regulations on local content are increas-
ingly being embodied in these agreements. This section 
therefore examines IIAs and the ways in which they limit 
policy space in this area. 
There are four main ways in which investment treaties 
can restrict states’ use of local content measures. One 
is through the non-discrimination provisions that are 
present in most, if not all, IIAs. Importantly, in a smaller 
48  Some IIAs will set forth their own specific rules regarding the circumstances 
under which conduct by an SOE can lead to state liability under an IIA. Absent 
explicit rules in the treaty on that issue, arbitral tribunals tend to apply the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts to determine whether conduct of an SOE will be 
attributable to the government and give rise to state liability.
49  Cancun WTO Ministerial 2003, Trade and Investment: From Bilaterals to  
a Multilateral Agreement?, available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief07_e.htm.
but growing share of IIAs, these obligations also cover 
market access issues by preventing discrimination at the 
“pre-establishment” phase. The second is through core 
“absolute” standards of protection including, in particu-
lar, the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) obligation.50 
The FET obligation is similarly present in the vast major-
ity of IIAs, and has been used to challenge measures that 
have negatively impacted investors’ business operations. 
The third way that IIAs can restrict use of local content 
measures is through express restrictions on “performance 
requirements”. Although only a minority of IIAs contains 
express restrictions on performance requirements, those 
IIAs have deep and broad impacts. Moreover, the number 
of IIAs with restrictions on performance requirements 
has been on the rise in recent years. Fourth, IIAs can limit 
local content measures through restrictions on require-
ments regarding the nationality of board members and 
senior management. Like pre-establishment provisions 
on non-discrimination and restrictions on performance 
requirements, such provisions on the nationality of board 
members and senior management are an increasingly 
common feature of IIAs. Together, and as discussed fur-
ther below, these four types of restrictions go well beyond 
the WTO in terms of the types of local content policies 
that they restrict.
Moreover, the key mechanism for dispute settlement 
under IIAs is fundamentally different than that under the 
WTO. IIAs typically give foreign investors direct rights 
to sue countries to recover damages for violations of 
investment treaties. These suits take place in arbitration 
proceedings referred to as “investor-state dispute settle-
ment” (ISDS). A broad range of foreign investors who have 
direct investments, portfolio investments, loans, fran-
chises, licenses, contracts, intellectual property or other 
assets in the host state can potentially sue that state and 
recover damages for alleged violations of IIAs. In contrast, 
under the WTO, allegations of breach are resolved through 
state-to-state proceedings, and compensation need not 
be paid for past harms resulting from violations of WTO 
commitments. 
50   “Relative” standards of protection are those for which the treatment owed to 
foreign investors and investments depends on the treatment provided to 
domestic investors and investments. Foreign investors and investments must 
not be treated less favorably than domestic investors or investments, but are 
not entitled to better treatment. In contrast, “absolute” standards require host 
states to provide foreign investors and investments a certain degree of 
protection irrespective of whether domestic investors and investments are 
entitled to or receive the same treatment. 
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Over roughly the past 20 years, the number of publicly 
known ISDS claims have increased in number from less 
than 10 to nearly 700.51 Known ISDS cases now surpass  
the number of WTO disputes that have been initiated.52 
And given that disputes can remain confidential, this 
count of roughly 700 ISDS disputes likely does not capture 
the full amount of such cases.
Importantly, the respective interests of different state 
parties to the WTO may align more closely regarding 
interpretation and application of WTO agreements than 
the respective interests of investors and states regarding 
interpretation and application of IIAs. This, in turn has 
implications for the frequency of disputes and interpreta-
tions of treaty obligations. Under the WTO, for example, 
notwithstanding complaints by State A’s firms regarding 
a measure adopted by State B, State A may have various 
diplomatic and policy reasons for not challenging State B’s 
allegedly WTO-inconsistent measure. Those reasons might 
include that State A maintains a similar measure to State B 
and shares State B’s perception regarding the legitimacy 
of those measures. If there is an IIA between State A and 
State B, however, a firm from State A could bring a claim 
against State B to challenge that measure and, in the ISDS 
proceedings, might advance (and secure tribunal accept-
ance of) an interpretation of the IIA that is in the investor’s 
interest, but might not necessarily align with the interpre-
tation of the IIA held by either State A or B.
Any consideration of the impact of IIAs’ obligations must 
also take into account the role of ISDS in treaty interpreta-
tion and enforcement.
51  UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Navigator, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (listing, on February 10, 2016, 
696 cases). 
52  According to the WTO’s publication, “WTO Dispute Settlement: Resolving 
Trade Disputes between WTO Members,” WTO Member States had brought 
488 cases to the WTO’s dispute settlement system as of the end of 2014; 
roughly half of those cases were resolved through consultations. See  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/dispute_brochure20y_e.pdf.
4.2.1   Scope of IIA Obligations 
As noted briefly above, there are four main ways in which 
IIAs’ obligations restrict the use of local content measures. 
This section describes those four channels in more detail. 
Non-Discrimination
Like the GATS, investment treaties contain national and 
most-favored nation treatment provisions prohibiting 
discrimination against foreign-owned or foreign-based 
entities. While the GATS prohibits discrimination between 
“like service suppliers”, investment treaties restrict dis-
crimination between “like investors” and/or “like invest-
ments”. Moreover, while the GATS applies on a “positive 
list” basis, only imposing restrictions if and to the extent a 
service sector is scheduled, the national treatment obliga-
tion in IIAs typically covers all sectors and activities unless 
an exception is included in the treaty.
As is described further below, there are various ways 
through which practices and policies relating to local con-
tent measures may breach these types of non-discrimina-
tion provisions in IIAs. Government initiatives that accord 
disparate treatment to investors or investments based on 
their ownership and their sourcing raise the most obvious 
concerns. 
Differential treatment based on ownership of firms  
and/or their sourcing of inputs
Measures that provide permissions, preferences, subsidies 
or other supports to domestic-owned firms but not to 
foreign-owned firms based on ownership-related criteria 
would likely be inconsistent with a national treatment 
obligation. Such measures could include rules restricting 
who may operate certain businesses, as well as tax breaks, 
preferential consideration in tenders, or other preferences 
or advantages offered to firms owned by any domestic 
citizens, or special groups such as indigenous or socially 
or economically disadvantaged groups within the country. 
Preferences or advantages available to domestic SOEs that 
are not likewise available to private firms may similarly 
violate the national treatment obligation,53 as might 
53  See, e.g., United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Award, May 24, 2007.  
This case involved a claim by a US investor that Canada violated the national 
treatment obligation by providing more favorable treatment to a Canadian  
SOE than to the US company with respect to their provision of postal and 
courier services. The fact that the Canadian company was state-owned did not, 
by itself, mean that the company was “unlike” privately owned companies.
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restrictions on investments by foreign-owned SOEs that 
do not similarly apply to privately owned firms (whether 
foreign or domestic).54
Additionally, measures that indirectly favor local firms by 
providing subsidies or other supports to any firm (domes-
tic or foreign) that purchases or accords a preference to 
goods or services produced by locally owned entities 
would also likely breach the national treatment obligation.
As noted above, to the extent these measures favor pro-
duction of goods in the host country, they may also be 
barred under the TRIMs Agreement. Depending on the 
relevant country’s schedule of commitments under the 
GATS, measures favoring domestic service providers that 
would be barred under the national treatment provision  
in IIAs may also have already been prohibited under 
the GATS. Yet although there is some overlap between 
national treatment obligations under IIAs and those under 
the WTO agreements, important distinctions between 
the two systems are (1) their different dispute settlement 
mechanisms, and (2) that IIAs cover all sectors and activi-
ties (whether related to goods or services) on a negative  
list basis. The practical effect of these differences is that 
IIAs produce a further reduction of policy space relevant 
for local content measures.
BOX 4   
Issue of Specific Investor-State Contracts  
and Incentives Packages
In some cases, an investor enters into a specific agreement with 
the government in which the investor commits to make a certain 
contribution to the local economy through local sourcing, local 
hiring, employee training, development of economic activities or 
other undertakings. In exchange for those and potentially other 
commitments, the investor is given certain benefits such as 
market access or fiscal and financial incentives. These types of 
arrangements are often established on a case-by-case basis, and 
can result in differential treatment of different investors and 
investments engaged in the same or similar economic activities 
54  See, e.g., Yuri Shima, “The Policy Landscape for International Investment by 
Government-controlled Investors: A Fact Finding Survey,” OECD Working 
Papers on International Investment, 2015/01, OECD Publishing; Mark 
Feldman, “The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties,” 
in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 
2010–2011 (Oxford University Press 2012).
such as automobile manufacturing, development of natural 
resources, generation of renewable energy, or any other industry 
or activity governments seek to facilitate and encourage. 
This differential treatment established through particular 
investor-state agreements, in turn, may give rise to discrimination 
claims. An investor that has entered into one investment contract 
with the host government might argue, for instance, that it is 
bound to more onerous local sourcing, hiring or training commit-
ments than another domestic or foreign investor that has a similar 
investment contract with the host government, or that it has  
not been given the same advantages or benefits in exchange for 
those commitments. Such disparate treatment, the investor could 
argue, constitutes improper discrimination between “like” 
investors. Similarly, if one investor obtains certain advantages 
such as access rights or incentives pursuant to an investor-state 
contract in which it also makes commitments for local develop-
ment, but other investors engaged in the same economic activities 
are subject to the general regulatory framework which neither 
requires domestic development commitments nor grants 
preferential treatment, investors in that latter group might argue 
that the treatment afforded through the investor-state contract is 
more favorable than the treatment they receive and breaches the 
relevant investment treaty’s non-discrimination obligations. 
The success of such investor claims depends on a range of factors 
including the specifics of the particular contract or contracts, 
whether the investors and investments allegedly receiving 
different treatment are actually “like”,55 and whether treatment  
of one is less favorable than another. But, as illustrated by Mesa v. 
Canada, an investment dispute that has been filed under the 
NAFTA,56 investors have spotted these issues, and are raising them 
55  The non-discrimination obligations – national treatment and most-favored 
nation treatment obligations – bar discrimination between “like” investors or 
investments. A threshold inquiry for a discrimination claim is therefore whether 
two or more investors or investments are actually “like” or in “like 
circumstances”. Governments seeking to accord different treatment to 
investors based on their impacts on domestic development may argue that 
investors with different impacts are not “like”; and, indeed, investment 
tribunals interpreting investment treaties have indicated that the nature and 
characteristics of investment projects – and their impacts on domestic 
society – are relevant to determining “likeness” of investors. (See, e.g., 
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 
September 11, 2007). It is not clear, however, whether all tribunals would 
follow such an approach or, even if they were open to the argument, what 
degree of scrutiny they would apply when reviewing assertions that one type 
of investment provides more development benefits than another. 
Consequently, and as some governments have done, it may be wise for 
governments seeking to pursue such development related policies to include 
relevant clarifications or exceptions in their investment treaties.
56  Mesa Power Group LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012–17.
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to challenge local content schemes and incentives offered in 
connection with investor-state contracts. 
In Mesa v. Canada, the claimant is a US investor that unsuccess-
fully participated in a tender to obtain a 20-year fixed-price 
feed-in-tariff (FIT) contract to sell renewable energy into the 
Ontario power grid. A key part of Mesa’s claims is that Canada 
violated the NAFTA’s non-discrimination obligations by entering 
into a $7 billion dollar deal with a “Korean Consortium” of 
companies. Under that deal, in exchange for commitments by the 
Consortium to establish local manufacturing facilities, the 
government gave the Consortium a number of benefits that were 
not available to investors such as Mesa under the standard 
procedures and terms of the FIT program. Those contractually 
agreed benefits enjoyed by the Consortium included preferential 
access to sell power into the grid and a higher price for energy 
produced.
According to Mesa, the Korean deal established a non-transparent 
and privileged legal and business framework for one particular 
group of investors that discriminated against other investors 
seeking market access. Canada, in response, has responded that 
such investor-state contracts are a useful tool for promoting 
investment and advancing sustainable development objectives 
like increasing employment and speeding deployment of 
renewable energy. 
As of February 1, 2016, the tribunal had not yet issued a decision 
on the investor’s claims.
To the extent that differential treatment of “like” investors is being 
effected through these investor-state contracts, such claims may 
arise more frequently in the future. 
 
Pre-Establishment Reach
Most IIAs only expressly cover investors and investments 
that are already established in the host country, and leave 
states relative freedom to determine whether to open 
their economy to foreign investors in the first place and, if 
so, to what extent and under what conditions. Some IIAs, 
however, extend protections to potential foreign investors 
and investments prior to their establishment in the host 
country. 
When states grant national treatment rights to investors 
and investments on such a “pre-establishment” basis, 
they are effectively liberalizing their markets and opening 
them to foreign investors on the same terms and under 
the same conditions as domestic investors. In contrast, if 
national treatment is only accorded to investors who have 
established their investments, or to established invest-
ments, states retain more policy space to determine when, 
whether and under what circumstances to allow foreign 
investors to establish investments in their territories. 
By including “pre-establishment” protections against 
discrimination, states thus narrow their abilities to shape 
the terms and conditions under which potential foreign 
investors enter their markets. This can include require-
ments relating to ownership and control (e.g., that foreign 
firms must have a certain amount of domestic equity or 
establish a joint venture with a local company), and may 
also include conditions such as incentives and require-
ments to transfer technology to or use technology of 
local firms, establish the company in a particular location, 
invest in research and development, or reinvest a certain 
amount of capital in the host country. 
Core “Absolute” Standards of Protection
IIAs’ substantive standards including, most notably, the 
FET obligation, prevent states from imposing measures 
on foreign investors or investments that interfere with 
investors/investments’ rights and, according to some 
interpretations, their “expectations”. Due in particular 
to the varying approaches tribunals have taken to defin-
ing the meaning of the FET obligation and the scope of 
rights and “expectations” that are protected under that 
obligation from government interference, it is difficult to 
identify whether a given government action will violate 
the standard. Yet as a number of cases have shown, these 
standards can be used to challenge a range of local content 
and other measures that increase the cost or reduce the 
profitability of investors’ operations. 
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Such standards have been used, for example, to challenge 
aspects of South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment 
mining policy which, inter alia, required mining com-
panies to offer to Black or Historically Disadvantaged 
Individuals 26% of their shares at market price.57 They 
have also been used to challenge conditions, duties and a 
future ban on copper concentrate that were imposed by 
 Indonesia in an effort to increase domestic processing of 
copper.58 Both proceedings were discontinued before any 
decision on the merits was reached; thus, it is unclear how 
a tribunal would have decided the cases. Nevertheless, 
particularly due to the cost of litigating IIA claims (which 
are reported to approach $5 million per case for respond-
ent states),59 the mere threat or initiation of a claim 
may prompt a government to abandon its local content 
policies. 
Express Restrictions on “Performance Requirements”
A small but growing share of IIAs include provisions 
restricting the use of “performance requirements”. 
“Performance requirements”, as used in IIAs, include 
mandatory and incentive-based local content measures. 
Box 5 provides an example of a recent IIA article on 
“performance requirements”, which comes from the IIA 
negotiated between Japan and Mongolia. It is included 
in full to illustrate the reach of some of these provisions 
and common language that is used to express the treaty 
obligations. 
Paragraph 1 lists flat government requirements and inves-
tor commitments or undertakings that are barred under 
the IIA; this paragraph does not address performance 
requirements that are only mandatory as a condition for 
receiving government advantages such as tax incentives. 
Such incentive-based performance requirements are still 
permitted unless they are barred by Paragraph 2. 
57  Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 
August 4, 2010.
58  See, e.g., PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara, Press Release: Arbitration Filed Over 
Export Restrictions in Indonesia (July 1, 2014); Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. 
and PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15, 
Order of the Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the 
Proceedings, August 29, 2014.
59  Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 9 
Global Arbitration Review, March 24, 2014 (finding that average costs for 
respondent states were US$ 4,437,000 and US$ 4,559,000 for claimants).
BOX 5  
Example of IIA Article Restricting Performance 
Requirements
Japan-Mongolia FTA, article 10.7
1.  Neither Party shall impose or enforce any of the following 
requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in 
connection with investment activities of an investor of a Party 
or of a non-Party in its Area to:
 (a) export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
 (b) achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
 (c)  purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced  
or services provided in its Area, or to purchase goods or 
services from persons in its Area; 
 (d)  relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the 
volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows associated with an investment of the 
investor;
 (e)  restrict sales of goods or services in its Area that an 
investment of the investor produces or provides by relating 
such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports 
or foreign exchange earnings; 
 (f) restrict the exportation or sale for export; 
 (g)  appoint, as executives, managers or members of boards of 
directors, individuals of any particular nationality; 
 (h)  locate the headquarters of that investor for a specific 
region or the world market in its Area; 
 (i) hire a given number or percentage of its nationals; 
 (j)  supply one or more of the goods that the investor produces 
or the services that the investor provides to a specific region 
or the world market, exclusively from the Area of the former 
Party; or 
 (k) adopt:
  (i)  given rate or amount of royalty under a license 
contract; or
  (ii  a given duration of the term of a license contract, 
with respect to any license contract freely entered into between  
the investor and a person in its Area, whether it has been entered 
into or not, provided that the requirement is imposed or the 
commitment or undertaking is enforced by an exercise of govern-
mental authority of the Party.
Note: A “license contract” referred to in this subparagraph  
means any license contract concerning transfer of technology,  
a production process, or other proprietary knowledge. 
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2.  Neither Party shall condition the receipt or continued receipt 
of an advantage, in connection with investment activities of an 
investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its Area, on compliance 
with any of the following requirements to: 
 (a) achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
 (b)  purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or 
services provided in its Area, or to purchase goods or 
services from persons in its Area; 
 (c)  relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the 
volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows associated with an investment of the 
investor; 
 (d)  restrict sales of goods or services in its Area that an 
investment of the investor produces or provides by relating 
such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports 
or foreign exchange earnings; or 
 (e)  restrict the exportation or sale for export. 
3. (a)  Nothing in paragraph 2 shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from conditioning the receipt or continued receipt of 
an advantage, in connection with investment activities of 
an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its Area, on 
compliance with a requirement to locate production, 
supply a service, train or employ workers, construct or 
expand particular facilities, or carry out research and 
development, in its Area.
 (b)  Subparagraph 1(k) shall not apply when the requirement is 
imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by 
a court or competition authority to remedy an alleged 
violation of laws controlling the anti-competitive activities. 
 (c)  Subparagraphs 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 2(a) and 2(b) shall not apply 
to qualification requirements for goods or services with 
respect to foreign aid programs.
 (d)  Subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) shall not apply to require-
ments imposed by an importing Party related to the 
content of goods necessary to qualify for preferential 
tariffs or preferential quotas. 
4.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to any requirement other 
than the requirements set out in those paragraphs. 
 
 
Restrictions on performance requirements can also be 
found in many of the other IIAs concluded by Japan as 
well as IIAs concluded by the United States and Canada 
with third states or groups of states.60 The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) is one recent and particular 
notable example of this trend. Concluded in 2015 between 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,  
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States and Vietnam, the TPP, like the excerpt from 
the agreement between Japan and Mongolia illustrated  
in Box 5, includes restrictions on a range of flat and 
incentive-based performance requirements.61 
In addition to Canada, Japan, and the United States, coun-
tries with a longer history of seeking to include restric-
tions on performance requirements in their investment 
treaties, a wider range of countries and negotiating blocks 
are also now adopting the same or similar practices of 
pursuing restrictions on performance requirements in 
their investment treaties.62 The IIA concluded between 
the European Union and Vietnam in December 2015 is 
an example of the spread of this practice as European 
countries had typically not previously included such 
provisions in their investment treaties. The restrictions 
on performance requirements in the European Union-
Vietnam IIA, however, differ from those that can be found 
in other agreements in that they only apply on a positive 
list basis.63 
Some IIAs that include these restrictions on performance 
requirements do so by merely incorporating the TRIMs 
Agreement. The substantive obligations are therefore no 
greater than they would be under the WTO, though ISDS 
makes challenges more likely and enforcement easier.
As illustrated by the Japan-Mongolia FTA, however, a 
number of IIAs go further, adding TRIMs+ obligations in 
60  See, e.g., U.S.-Sri Lanka Bilateral Investment Treaty, May 1, 1993, available  
at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43588.pdf;  
U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty, January 1, 2012, available at  
www.state.gov/documents/organization/101735.pdf.
61 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 9.9.
62  See, e.g., Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 9-07, available at  
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=196020. See also 
IISD, South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Same Old Story?, available 
at www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_south_bits.pdf, at 4. See, e.g., the BITs 
between El Salvador and Peru (1996), the Dominican Republic and Ecuador 
(1998), and Bolivia and Mexico (1995). UNCTAD Report at 5.
63 European Union-Vietnam FTA, Investment Chapter, art. 4.
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their text. These TRIMs+ obligations may include provi-
sions barring states from imposing or enforcing any:
§§ Flat64 or incentive-based65 measure requiring foreign 
investors to use or accord a preference to local provid-
ers of services. These provisions have been interpreted 
as barring states from requiring investors to make local 
expenditures on services, including on in-country R&D 
or education and training.66 Following this line of inter-
pretation, it seems that requirements to make domestic 
expenditures in other activities such as construction 
or provision of shared-use infrastructure might also be 
restricted under these provisions (see Boxes 3 and 7).
§§ Flat or incentive-based measures requiring foreign 
investors to achieve set levels or percentages of 
“domestic content”.67 “Domestic content” is typically 
not defined, but can be interpreted broadly as cover-
ing measures that can be satisfied through domestic 
expenditures on labor, services, and/or goods. 
§§ Commitment or requirement for foreign investors 
to hire a given number or percentage of host country 
nationals.68
§§ Commitment or requirement for foreign investors to 
locate their global or regional headquarters in the host 
country.69
§§ Export restrictions.70 While the GATT and TRIMs 
Agreement prevent quantitative restrictions on 
exports, some IIAs include a flat prohibition against 
any restriction on exports, including measures such as 
taxes and permit conditions on exports. These types 
of measures restricting exports are tools that could be 
used by host states, for example, to try to encourage 
domestic processing of raw materials.
§§ Commitment or requirement for investors to “transfer 
a technology, a production process or other propri-
etary knowledge to a person in its territory.”71 There is 
typically no definition of “technology transfer” in these 
64 Canada-Benin BIT, art. 10(1)(c).
65 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(2)(b).
66  Mobil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability  
and Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012.
67  Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(b) & (2)(b); Canada-Benin BIT,  
art. 10(1)(b) & (3)(b).
68 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(i).
69 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(h).
70 Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 10.7(1)(f).
71 NAFTA, art. 1106(1)(f).
agreements, but they could be interpreted broadly 
to include such activities as providing employee 
training.72
§§ Terms specifying the royalty under or duration of a 
license or contract for transfer of technology entered 
into between a foreign investor and state- or non-
state-entity.73 Such provisions can arguably prevent the 
government from promoting dissemination and appli-
cation of technologies generated through government- 
or university-supported R&D programs undertaken 
with industry. When supporting private R&D, govern-
ments often have the right to and do impose certain 
conditions on intellectual property rights associated 
with results of the R&D programs in order to maximize 
use of those resulting technologies. Such IIA provisions 
seem to restrict those types of practices.
In addition to the sheer scope of these restrictions, there 
are other aspects of these IIA provisions that are impor-
tant to highlight. 
First, they often prohibit state parties to the IIA from 
imposing or enforcing performance requirements on any 
investor or foreign investor, not just investors of the other 
state party. The TPP illustrates; it states that its restrictions 
on performance requirements “apply to all investments 
in the territory” of the host state.74 When a state signs an 
agreement containing this type of text, the obligation is 
effectively multilateralized. While an investor from a state 
that is not party to the IIA would not be able to enforce 
this multilateralized obligation, the obligation could 
potentially be enforced by the other state party (or parties)  
to the IIA through state-to-state dispute resolution. The 
multilateralized obligation could also potentially be 
enforced by a foreign investor covered by the IIA though 
ISDS proceedings. If, for example, the terms of a govern-
ment tender called for the government to consider perfor-
mance on local content metrics when awarding contracts,  
and an investor covered by the IIA lost its bid for a gov-
ernment contract, that covered investor may be able to 
challenge the bid process and decision through ISDS on 
the ground that consideration of local-content-related-
criteria violated the IIA and led to an improper award. 
72 Canada-Benin BIT, art. 10(1)(f).
73 Japan-Mongolia BIT, art. 10.7(1)(k).
74 TPP, art. 9.2(1)(c).
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Second, even when an IIA does not include express restric-
tions on performance requirements, an investor may be 
able to use the IIA’s most-favored nation provision to 
“import” restrictions on performance requirements from 
other IIAs the host state has signed. This possibility makes  
it imperative for states to consider policy coherence across 
the range of IIAs they have concluded.75 
Third, the provisions typically make clear that it is not only 
the imposition of performance requirements through law 
or regulation that is prohibited, but also the enforcement 
of investors’ commitments or undertakings to comply 
with performance requirements. One implication of such 
language is that when there is an investor-state contract 
in which an investor has agreed to comply with certain 
performance requirements (in exchange for benefits it has 
negotiated for from the government), a state may later  
be barred from actually enforcing the investor’s obligation. 
This potentially alters the balance of costs and benefits 
secured through contract negotiations (see Box 6).
Fourth, as noted above, IIAs differ from WTO-based 
restrictions on performance requirements in that they 
allow covered foreign investors to bring claims for breach 
of these obligations, thus creating a large pool of potential 
“enforcers” (see Box 7 for examples of ISDS cases, includ-
ing three ISDS claims by US investors that were brought 
to challenge a Mexican tax which was also the subject of 
a WTO dispute between the US and Mexico).76 Although 
claims and decisions alleging violations of these provi-
sions have thus far been relatively limited, that is likely 
to change due to (1) the growing number of IIAs overall, 
75  This issue of importation is similar to the first point on multilateralization. 
Through multilateralized obligations, IIAs provide that state parties may not 
impose or enforce performance requirements on any investor, not just 
investors covered by the treaty. In contrast, importation through the MFN 
provision allows a covered investor to benefit from restrictions on performance 
requirements contained in other treaties. Thus, while multilateralization 
expands the reach of a host state’s obligations to cover a broad range of 
investors, including investors not covered by an IIA signed by the host country, 
importation expands the scope of protections that are enjoyed by covered 
investors. There are also differences between multilateralization and 
importation in terms of who can enforce the obligation: A multilateralized 
obligation in an IIA does not give foreign investors that are not covered by that 
IIA the right to enforce the IIA’s multilateralized restrictions on performance 
requirements through ISDS. Yet when a foreign investor that is covered by an 
IIA without any provisions on performance requirements uses the most-
favored nation obligation to import restrictions on performance requirements 
from another IIA, that foreign investor can use the ISDS mechanism in its IIA 
to enforce the “imported” provisions.
76  Notably, the European Union-Vietnam IIA excludes the obligations on 
performance requirements from the treaty’s ISDS mechanism.
and, accordingly, the amount of investors and investment 
that IIAs cover, (2) the increasing inclusion of restrictions 
on performance requirements in IIAs, and (3) the overall 
rise in ISDS claims. As claims and decisions mount, there 
will likely be (potentially costly) arbitration proceed-
ings to provide further clarification on key terms such 
as “domestic content”,77 an “advantage”78 and “transfer of 
technology.”79 The precise meaning of these terms given 
by ISDS tribunals will have a significant – and as yet 
unknown – impact on the scope of government exposure 
to litigation and liability. 
BOX 6  
Investor-State Contracts, Local Content Policies, 
and Enforceability of Commitments
With the rise in contract transparency in investment in extractive 
industries and land,80 it is increasingly possible to see the terms of 
investor-state contracts. One feature of many of these contracts  
is a provision or series of provisions on local content, which aim to 
ensure that the project produces positive spillovers into the 
domestic economy through job creation, linkage creation, and 
diversification.
 
As noted in one study of 12 investor-state contracts regarding 
agricultural projects in Africa, these deals often have provisions  
(of varying strength and specificity) requiring local employment, 
mandating establishment of local outgrower schemes, obliging 
firms to use or strive to use local providers of goods and services, 
and/or requiring local processing of agricultural commodities.81
While these provisions can be key to enabling host countries and 
communities to benefit from investment projects, there is a risk 
that IIAs render them unenforceable. This is because provisions in 
77  “Domestic content” targets set in legislation or contract often are satisfied by 
expenditures on goods, services, and labor. Thus the term, at least in some 
contexts, has a broad meaning. The meaning under IIAs is arguably also broad. 
In particular, as can be seen in the excerpt from the Japan-Mongolia FTA, IIAs 
often contain (1) restrictions on requirements to use local providers of goods; 
(2) restrictions on requirements to use local providers of services; and (3) 
restrictions on targets for “domestic content”. In order for “domestic content” 
to have any meaning in the treaty, it is arguable that it goes beyond use of 
domestic goods and services, and also prohibits targets on use of domestic 
labor or other expenditures.
78  See Box 7 (discussion of decision in Mobil v. Canada).
79 See Box 1.
80 See, e.g, resourcecontracts.org and openlandcontracts.org.
81  Lorenzo Cotula, Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contract?  
(IIED 2011) 26–27.
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IIAs that restrict the use of mandatory performance requirements 
often not only bar states from both “imposing” local content 
requirements, but also bar them from “enforcing” Investors’ 
contractual “commitments or undertakings” to comply with those 
requirements. 
 
Restrictions on Senior Management and Boards of 
Directors
A number of more recent IIAs contain provisions limiting 
the types of requirements host states can impose on the 
nationality or residence of senior management and/or 
boards of directors. In IIAs with these provisions, govern-
ments are typically prohibited from requiring that senior 
management be of any particular nationality; neverthe-
Local Content and Supportive Policies International Law Restrictions
Basic local content requirements – 
measures that require or encourage 
inventors/investments to use a certain 
amount or proportion of local resources 
(including labor, services, materials and 
parts) when producing goods or 
providing services 




GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is sector is scheduled, the GATS prevents 




achieve a level or percentage of domestic content through expenditures on domestic 
labor, goods, and services
•	 	prevent	states	from	requiring	or,	in	some	cases	incentivizing,	investors	to	use  
or accord a preference to local providers of goods or services
•	 prevent	states	from	requiring	use	of	domestic	labor
•	 	prevent	states	from	requiring	investors	to	make	in-country	expenditures	(including	
intra-firm expenditures) on services such as company expenditures on R&D or  
education and training
•	 	bar	enforcement	of	contractual	provisions	containing	commitments	by	investors	to	
comply with any of these requirements
•	 	result	in	liability	for	any	measure	that	has	the	effect	of	discriminating	against	the	
operation or, in some cases, establishment of foreign-owned investments in the  
host country, or that otherwise negatively affects the operations or establishment  
of foreign-owned investments.
TABLE 7  Local Content Measures, Supportive Policies, and Restrictions under WTO Law and IIAs
less, governments commonly retain some measure of free-
dom to require that a majority of the board of directors be 
nationals or residents of the host state, “provided that the 
requirement does not materially impair the ability of the 
investor to exercise control over its investment.”82 Having 
board members be resident in the host country can help 
increase the value added of and spillovers generated by 
activities of that affiliate in the host country, and can also 
help promote management decisions beneficial to the 
host country. 
Table 7 below summarizes the restrictions that WTO 
agreements and IIAs – depending on the language of 
the particular agreement – may impose on local content 
measures and supportive policies.
82  See, e.g., Canada-Benin BIT, art. 9; Canada-Peru FTA, art. 806(2); NAFTA,  
art. 1107.
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Local Content and Supportive Policies International Law Restrictions
Export restraints including quantitative 
restrictions, export taxes, or other 
restraints used to require or encourage 
domestic value-added;
TRIMs Agreement – prevents quantitative restrictions on exports that can be used to 
promote or require domestic beneficiation/processing.
IIAs – can prevent a broader array of restrictions on exports through restrictions on 
performance requirements or, depending on the effects of the measure on the investor’s 
operations, the FET or other substantive obligations.
Joint venture requirements requiring 
foreign investors to partner with 
domestic firms or other entities such as 
research institutions;
GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is scheduled, prevents states from imposing 
restrictions or requirements on the type of foreign-owned entity established in the host 
country, including requirements that investments be made through joint ventures.
IIAs – prohibit joint venture requirements if the IIAs provide pre-establishment national 
treatment protections (and no relevant exceptions are included in the treaty). Under  
the national treatment, FET or other substantive provisions, IIAs may also restrict 
introduction of joint venture requirements if a foreign firm has already been established 
and is operating and is then made subject to the joint venture requirements.
Local management requirements 
requiring nationals to be on boards or 
in senior management;
IIAs – may prohibit requirements regarding the nationality of senior management but 
have typically permitted requirements on the nationality or residence of members of 
boards of directors.
Local equity requirements requiring 
firms to have a certain share of 
domestic ownership; and 
GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is scheduled, prevents states from imposing 
domestic equity requirements.
IIAs – prevent local equity requirements if the IIAs provide pre-establishment national 
treatment protections (and no relevant exceptions are included in the treaty). Under the 
national treatment, FET or other substantive provisions, the IIAs may also restrict 
introduction of local equity requirements if a foreign firm has already been established 
and is operating and is then made subject to the joint venture requirements.
Location requirements requiring 
companies to locate their global or 
regional headquarters or certain other 
operations (e.g., R&D operations) in the 
host state, or to establish operations  
in a particular location in the host state 




incentives to “use” local services or achieve “domestic content”. As suggested in at least 
one arbitral decision, IIA provisions preventing requirements on investors to use or 
accord a preference to local providers of goods or services may prohibit measures 
requiring R&D, headquarters, or other operations to be located in the host country.
Supportive policies such as subsidies 
designed to help support development 
of local businesses (all businesses, 
SMEs, minority-owned businesses, etc.)
SCM Agreement – prevents use of subsidies that are contingent on use of local goods or 
that cause “adverse effects” to the interests of other WTO Members.
GATS – if and to the extent the service sector is scheduled, the GATS prevents subsidies 
that are given to domestically owned service firms but not provided to foreign-owned 
firms; it may also prevent subsidies given to domestically incorporated firms that are not 
given to service firms located abroad but providing services in the country. 
IIAs – non-discrimination provisions will restrict governments’ abilities to provide 
subsidies or other supports to domestically owned firms that aren’t similarly provided  
to foreign-owned firms.
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4.2.2   Exceptions 
As noted above, IIAs generally apply to all investments in 
all sectors unless the treaty states otherwise. Most invest-
ment treaties have contained no or only very limited 
exceptions to their provisions, although the number of 
exceptions is growing in recent treaties. Among the more 
common of these still limited exceptions have been provi-
sions protecting governments’ abilities to take measures 
necessary to protect their “essential security” interests, and 
measures carving out taxation measures from some or all 
of the agreement.
In more recent agreements states have begun to include 
exceptions or reservations that can help protect some 
measure of policy space. These include:
§§ Exceptions to their pre- and post-establishment 
national treatment obligations for advantages or 
preferences given to indigenous peoples or historically 
disadvantaged groups; governments subsidies; govern-
ment procurement; and certain social services;  
 
EXAMPLE: Canada’s reservations to the TPP’s provi-
sions on non-discrimination, performance require-
ments, and senior management and boards of directors 
include the following carve-outs for existing and 
future measures:  
 
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain a meas-
ure denying investors … and their investments, or service 
providers of a Party, any rights or preferences provided 
to aboriginal peoples.83 
 
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain a 
measure conferring rights or privileges to a socially or 
economically disadvantaged minority.84  
§§ Exceptions to restrictions on performance require-
ments for environmental, health or other specified 
objectives;  
 
EXAMPLE: The TPP includes the following exception to 
its restrictions on performance requirements: 
 
 
83 TPP, Annex II, Schedule of Canada, at 2.
84 TPP, Annex II, Schedule of Canada, at 6.
Provided that such measures are not applied in an 
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a 
 disguised restriction on international trade or invest-
ment, paragraphs 1(b) [prohibiting domestic content 
requirements], 1(c) [prohibiting requirements to use or 
accord a preference to locally produced goods], 1(f) [pro-
hibiting technology transfer requirements], 2(a) [pro-
hibiting incentives tied to compliance with domestic 
content requirements] and 2(b) [prohibiting incentives 
tied to compliance with requirements to use or accord a 
preference to locally produced goods] shall not be con-
strued to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures, including environmental measures: 
 
(i) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regula-
tions that are not inconsistent with this Agreement; 
(ii) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; or (iii) related to the conservation of living or 
non-living exhaustible natural resources.85 
§§ And exceptions to restrictions on requirements regard-
ing senior management and boards of directors for 
investments receiving particular government benefits, 
and investments in particular industries or activities.  
 
EXAMPLE: In the TPP, the states included the following 
exception:  
 
Article 9.4 (National Treatment), Article 9.5 (Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment) and Article 9.10 (Senior 
Management and Board of Directors) shall not apply to: 
(a) government procurement; or (b) subsidies or grants 
provided by a Party,  including government-supported 
loans, guarantees and  insurance.86 
 
Individual countries also included specific exceptions 
to this obligation, including exceptions for certain 
investments over a particular size in agriculture, 
investments in various categories of public services, 
and investments in formerly state-owned enterprises.87
85 TPP, art. 9.9(3)(d).
86 TPP, art. 9.11(6).
87 TPP, Annex II, Schedule of Australia.
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Nevertheless, the vast majority of existing IIAs contain 
no or only very limited exceptions to the national treat-
ment requirements and no or only very few exceptions to 
substantive obligations such as the FET obligation which, 
as described above, can impose significant restraints on 
governments’ abilities to use local content measures and 
supportive policies to help ensure the effectiveness of 
such measures. 
BOX 7 
ISDS Cases Finding Governments Liable for Using 
Performance Requirements
To date, there have only been a limited number of publicly known 
ISDS cases in which investors have claimed that the host 
government violated an IIA’s restrictions on performance 
requirements. Almost all of those 12 cases have been brought 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
concluded between the United States, Canada and Mexico.88
Of those 12, the investor succeeded on its claims that the 
government imposed prohibited performance requirements in 
three disputes.89 Those cases are discussed below.
The “Corn Products” Cases
Two of the cases in which investors prevailed on their perfor-
mance requirements claims involved claims against Mexico 
relating to a 20% tax it imposed on beverages and other products 
that contained sweeteners other than cane sugar such as high 
fructose corn syrup (HFCS).90 When the tax was imposed, HFCS 
was either produced outside of Mexico, or by primarily foreign-
owned firms in Mexico; in contrast, cane sugar was produced by 
Mexican-owned companies in Mexico.91 Justifications given for 
the tax were that it was needed to address a deepening crisis in 
88  Data on the number of cases in which investors alleged violation of IIAs’ 
articles on performance requirements, and on the status and outcome  
of those cases, comes from UNCTAD’s database of ISDS cases, available at  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.
89  In four of the 12 cases, the investor prevailed on other claims of IIA  
breach, but not on its arguments that the host state breached the treaty’s 
restrictions on performance requirements. In two of the cases, the  
investor did not prevail on any of its claims. One of the cases settled;  
another was discontinued; and another is still pending. This data is drawn  
from UNCTAD’s database on ISDS claims (as of December 15, 2015),  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches.
90  Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) v. Mexico, ICSID Case  
No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, November 21, 2007; Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, September 18, 2009.
91 Cargill, at 105–106.
Mexico’s domestic sugar industry, which had been driven in part 
by increased imports of HFCS from the United States, and 
restrictions the US placed on imports of Mexican cane sugar into 
the US market.92 
In 2004 and 2005, several US investors initiated arbitration against 
Mexico challenging Mexico’s tax under the NAFTA. (The US also 
challenged the tax before the WTO, and received a favorable 
panel decision in October 2005;93 Mexico subsequently, and 
unsuccessfully, challenged the WTO panel’s findings.94) Mexico 
repealed the tax on January 1, 2007.
A US investor that brought one of the ISDS cases, Cargill, Inc., 
produced HFCS in the United States and had established a 
subsidiary and distribution centers in Mexico to sell and distribute 
HFCS in the Mexican market. Cargill argued that Mexico’s tax 
made the use of HFCS prohibitively expensive and effectively 
destroyed its sales and distribution business in Mexico. In its 
performance requirements claim, Cargill asserted that the tax 
violated Article 1106 of the NAFTA, which states in part:
3.  No Party may condition the receipt or continued receipt of an 
advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of 
an investor of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with 
any of the following requirements: 
 …
 (b)  to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced 
in its territory, or to purchase goods from producers in its 
territory[.]95
According to Cargill, although the tax was imposed on firms 
operating in the downstream segment of the value chain 
(producing soft drinks) and did not directly apply to Cargill’s 
upstream operations or products (selling and distributing HFCS to 
beverage companies), the tax was prohibited under Article 1106 
because it provided an advantage (i.e., the opportunity to avoid 
the tax) conditioned on use of domestically produced cane sugar. 
92 Id. at paras. 62-100.
93  Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTIDS308/R 
(issued October 7, 2005, adopted by the DSB as modified by the Appellate 
Body, on March 24, 2006).
94  Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
March 24, 2006.
95 NAFTA, art. 1106.
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In a 2009 award, the ISDS tribunal agreed with Cargill’s argu-
ments. The tribunal’s decision shows that performance require-
ments designed to support one segment of the value chain (e.g., 
upstream agricultural producers) can result in liability if those 
requirements negatively affect foreign investors in other segments 
of that chain (e.g., downstream distributers). 
The Cargill tribunal ordered Mexico to pay Cargill over US$ 77 
million in damages plus interest, which included losses suffered 
by Cargill’s operations in Mexico, as well as losses of Cargill’s 
production facilities in the United States.96
In the other “Corn Products” case finding that Mexico’s tax 
violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance requirements, 
the claimants were US companies that had invested in a Mexican 
subsidiary to produce and sell HFCS in Mexico. In a 2006 decision, 
the tribunal ordered Mexico to pay the claimants roughly US$ 33.5 
million as compensation for breach of NAFTA Article 1106 as well 
as breach of the NAFTA’s national treatment obligation.97
There was a third case brought against Mexico challenging this 
tax, Corn Products International v. Mexico.98 In a 2009 decision, 
the tribunal determined that Mexico’s tax violated the NAFTA’s 
national treatment obligation, but rejected the investor’s 
arguments that Mexico had violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on 
performance requirements.99 The fact that this tribunal decided 
against the investor on its performance requirements claims, 
while the other two ISDS tribunals found that the same Mexican 
tax violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance require-
ments, helps illustrate the inconsistencies that can arise in  
ISDS disputes, and the difficulties in predicting their outcomes. 
The Corn Products tribunal ordered Mexico to pay the investor 
US$ 58 million in damages based on the national treatment 
violation.100
96    The United States, Canada, and Mexico all objected to the portion of the 
tribunal’s decision determining that damages should include losses suffered 
by Cargill’s investments in the United States. In addition to finding that 
Mexico violated Article 1106 of the NAFTA, the tribunal determined that it 
breached the treaty’s national treatment and FET obligations. Cargill, at 160.
97   ADM, at 93.
98   ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Award, August 18, 2009.
99   Id. at paras. 79-80.
100   UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, ISDS Database (as of December 15, 2015), 
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/166.
Mobil v. Canada
The third case holding a state liable for imposing prohibited 
performance requirements involved a case against Canada 
challenging requirements on investors in the offshore oil and gas 
industry to invest in R&D and education and training (E&T) in the 
host country.101
When oil was discovered off the coast of Newfoundland (NL) in 
Canada in the late 1970s, the government of NL and the federal 
government of Canada adopted legislation (the “Accord Acts”) 
seeking to ensure development of those oil resources was used  
to catalyze sustainable growth and development. Part of that 
legislation requires any petroleum operator looking to be licensed 
for activities in the area to submit and secure approval of a 
Development Plan, which lays out the general approach for 
developing an oil field, and a Benefits Plan explaining how NL and 
Canada would benefit from the project. Among other things, the 
Benefits Plan has to set forth the company’s plans for conducting 
R&D and E&T in the area. The legislation also established a  
board (the “Board”) to ensure compliance with the Accord Acts 
requirements. 
When the NAFTA came into force in 1994, Canada included the 
Accord Acts (and subordinate measures adopted pursuant to this 
legislation) as part of its schedule of “non-conforming measures”, 
exempting it from the treaty’s restrictions on performance 
requirements. 
In 2004, the Board issued guidelines seeking to strengthen 
companies’ contributions to R&D and E&T. Shortly thereafter, two 
US companies, each of which indirectly owned minority share-
holdings in two offshore oilfields in NL that were governed by the 
Accord Acts, challenged the guidelines before Canadian courts as 
impermissibly expanding the companies’ obligations. Those 
Canadian courts, however, rejected the companies’ arguments, 
determining that the Board had acted within its authority under 
the Accord Acts to “monitor research and development expendi-
tures and intervene by issuing guidelines requiring higher 
expenditures should the [companies’] level of expenditures fall 
below that which the Board considered appropriate.”102
101   Mobil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Canada’s Counter-Memorial, 
December 1, 2009, para. 14.
102   Mobil Investments and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, 
Canada’s Counter-Memorial, December 1, 2009, para. 6 (citing a decision by 
the Canadian Court of Appeal).
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Subsequently, in 2007, the companies filed a case against Canada 
under the NAFTA, arguing that the strengthened guidelines 
requiring investors to conduct R&D and E&T in Canada violated 
the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance requirements. More 
specifically, the companies argued that the guidelines violated the 
treaty’s provision prohibiting states from “impos[ing] or 
enforc[ing] … requirements … to purchase, use or accord a 
preference to goods produced or services provided in its territory, 
or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory.” 
[NAFTA, Art. 1106(1)(c)].
The tribunal of three arbitrators appointed to decide this dispute 
agreed with the claimants. The arbitrators concluded that R&D 
and E&T are “services”, and that requirements to make local 
expenditures on those services as a condition of receiving 
development approvals constituted requirements to purchase or 
use services in the host country in violation of the NAFTA. A 
majority of the tribunal also determined that the guidelines were 
not protected by Canada’s reservation for non-conforming 
measures. Two of the three arbitrators determined that, although 
Canada had carved out the Accord Acts (and “subordinate 
measures”) from the NAFTA’s restrictions on performance 
requirements, the Board’s guidelines represented such a signifi-
cant change as compared to prior practice that the guidelines 
could not be considered to be “subordinate measures” similarly 
protected by the carve-out for non-conforming measures.103 
The tribunal subsequently ordered Canada to pay CDN$ 17 million 
to the companies as compensation for the unlawful performance 
requirements.104
This decision illustrates several key issues. One is that the tribunal 
apparently considered the R&D and E&T requirements to be 
mandatory obligations, as opposed to conditions imposed on 
investors in order to gain a particular “advantage” (i.e., the 
“advantage” of securing eligibility for development approvals). As 
noted above, IIA provisions on performance requirements often 
prohibit a wide range of flat, mandatory local content measures, 
but may permit local content measures if relevant requirements 
are imposed as a condition for the investor to obtain an “advan-
tage”. Under the NAFTA, for example, requirements to purchase, 
use, or accord a preference to local services are not barred if those 
requirements are imposed as a condition in order to obtain an 
103   Mobil Investments and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, 
Decision on Liability and Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012. 
104   Mobil Investments and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, 
Award, February 20, 2015.
“advantage”. Thus, the meaning of an “advantage” is key for 
assessing the scope of IIA restrictions. 
A second issue illustrated by Mobil is the wide interpretations 
given by the tribunal to the term “services” and to the meaning  
of requirements to “purchase” or “use” a service of a domestic 
provider. On that latter point, the tribunal seemed to equate 
domestic expenditures on services (even intra-firm expenditures) 
with purchase or use of services from local providers.
A third issue highlighted by Mobil is the importance and difficulty 
of appropriately listing non-conforming measures in schedules 




Summary of Trends in Interna-
tional Law Toward Policy Space for 
Local Content Measures
As shown above, with entry into force of the WTO,  
Member States committed to a number of obligations  
that limited their ability to accord preferences to domes-
tic economic actors. Measures restricted under the WTO 
include provisions that discriminate against foreign-
manufactured goods in favor of locally produced items 
and, to the extent states have consented, measures that 
discriminate against foreign-owned or foreign-based 
service suppliers to the benefit of locally owned or locally 
established services firms. 
Yet under WTO law, states have retained significant  
freedom to use non-discriminatory subsidies to support  
development and improve the competitiveness of 
domestic industry, to spur development in disadvantaged 
regions, and to provide preferential treatment to minori-
ties, indigenous communities, or other groups entitled to 
special treatment under domestic or international human 
rights law; to control terms of market access (unless they 
had agreed otherwise) and condition access and opera-
tions on compliance with joint venture, domestic equity, 
or other local content requirements; to require or encour-
age technology transfer through various policies; to 
encourage or require local hiring; and to encourage  
or require R&D to be conducted within their territories. 
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FIGURE 1   Illustrative List of Restricted Measures – IIAs and WTO Law
IIAs
§§ National Treatment
§§ Restricts measures providing subsidies or 
other benefits to locally owned firms but not 
foreign-owned firms
§§ Restricts measures favoring use of locally 
owned firms
§§ In pre-establishment treaties, prevents 
measures restricting market access of 
foreign firms
§§ Most-favored Nation Treatment
§§ Potentially restricts use of investor-state 
contracts providing benefits to some 
investors not provided under the general 
legal framework or to other foreign investors
§§ Core Absolute Protections (e.g. FET and 
restrictions on uncompensated expropriation)
§§ Restrict measures that interfere with 
investor rights and, according to some 
interpretations, expectations
§§ Restrictations on Performance Requirements
§§ Incorporate TRIMs or TRIMS+ rules 
restricting a wide range of mandatory and 
incentive-based local content measures
WTO Law
§§ TRIMs Agreement
§§ Restricts measures requiring use of 
local goods
§§ Prevents measures restricting imports 
and exports
§§ GATS
§§ (Depending on commitments made) 
restricts measures discriminating 
against foreingn service suppliers
§§ (Depending on commitments made) 
prevents measures restricting market 
access
§§ SCM Agreement
§§ Restricts subsidies continent on use 
of local goods or export performance
§§ Restricts subsidies that have 
an “adverse effect” on other 
WTO Members
With the proliferation and deepening of IIAs, however, 
much of the policy space left to countries under WTO law 
has been receding, and governments are left with fewer 
tools to both support development of local firms, and to 
establish and create the linkages with foreign investors 
that can, in turn, promote diversification, facilitate tech-
nology transfer and innovation, and provide a channel for 
domestic firms to move into and up GVCs. Crucially, these 
restrictions on policy space are also made easily enforce-
able by investors who can challenge and seek compensa-
tion for host state measures directly through ISDS. The 
policy space left to governments now is thus dramatically 
different than it was 20, and even just 10 years ago.
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5Comparing relevant policy measures listed under Tables 1–3 and policy restraints listed under Table 7 highlights 
that governments are presently being pulled in two dif-
ferent directions in terms of, on one hand, their commit-
ments to advance sustainable development and, on the 
other, commitments to refrain from interfering in private 
sector operations through adoption of local content poli-
cies. As countries are currently involved in establishing 
policies for implementing the SDGs, and also continuing 
to engage in negotiations for new IIAs, it is a crucial time 
to revisit an old debate on the appropriate degree of policy 
space that should be allowed for local content measures, 
and seek to improve the consistency and maximize the 
synergies between these traditionally separate policy 
spheres. 
There are various levels at which action can be taken. First, 
at the domestic level, it is critical for governments (fed-
eral/national, state/provincial, and local) to do an assess-
ment of the policy needs and strategies they have used 
and may use to advance SDG aims. These include assess-
ments of types of local supports, technology transfer, 
and linkages policies that have been or may be employed. 
By better understanding existing and potential future 
industrial policy strategies, governments can gain a better 
understanding of the types of policy tools that should be 
safeguarded.
At the domestic level, it is also important for those 
involved in formulating trade and investment policy and 
negotiating (or renegotiating) trade and investment trea-
ties to provide for effective multistakeholder dialogue. 
This dialogue can help increase understanding of the costs 
and benefits of supportive measures and local content 
policy tools from the perspective of affected businesses as 
well as the actual or intended beneficiaries of such meas-
ures. Similarly, such dialogue is imperative for ensuring 
that commitments made in trade and investment agree-
ments advance, and do not undermine, commitments on 
sustainable development objectives. 
In this context, the roles of developing capital exporting 
states and developed capital importing states may differ. 
Consistent with the principle of special and differen-
tial treatment, and the need to ensure that developing 
countries have an effective voice in shaping international 
economic rules, both concepts that are highlighted in 
the SDGs, it is crucial for developed states to consider the 
impacts of their trade and investment policies on devel-
oping country partners. Among other things, developed 
countries should refrain from taking advantage of weak 
bargaining power or relatively limited resources of nego-
tiating parties to secure commitments that effectively 
lock developing, capital importing states into positions 
as mere passive recipients of foreign investment that are 
largely powerless to more actively shape and maximize 
the potentially transformative benefits such investments 
can provide. 
Similarly, there is an important role for developed states 
and development institutions to ensure that states under-
stand the implications of IIAs including, in particular, 
implications for achievement of sustainable development 
objectives. In this context, one additional area of future 
action would be to enhance analysis and understanding  
of new provisions of IIAs, their effects on different local 
content policies and the goals sought to be obtained  
by those policies, and the costs and benefits of expanded 
enforcement mechanisms and compensation require-
ments for violations of relevant IIA provisions. 
Policy Conclusions and Options
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